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The Problem with Words: Plain Language
and Public Participation
in Rulemaking
Cynthia R. Farina,* Mary J. Newhart,** and Cheryl Blake***
ABSTRACT
This Article, part of the special issue commemorating the fiftieth anniver-
sary of the Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”), situates
ACUS’s recommendations for improving public rulemaking participation in
the context of the federal “plain language” movement.  The connection be-
tween broader, better public participation and more comprehensible rulemak-
ing materials seems obvious, and ACUS recommendations have recognized
this connection for almost half a century.  Remarkably, though, the series of
presidential and statutory plain-language directives on this topic have not even
mentioned the relationship of comprehensibility to participation until very re-
cently.  In 2012, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”)
issued “Executive Summary Guidance,” instructing that “straightforward ex-
ecutive summaries” be included in “lengthy or complex rules.”  OIRA rea-
soned that “[p]ublic participation cannot occur . . . if members of the public
are unable to obtain a clear sense of the content of [regulatory] requirements.”
Using a novel dataset of proposed and final rule documents from 2010
through 2014, this Article examines the effect of the executive summary re-
quirement.  The results show that the use of executive summaries increased
substantially compared with the modest executive-summary practice pre-Gui-
dance.  Additionally, agencies have done fairly well in providing summaries
for “lengthy” rules.  Success in providing the summary in “complex” rules,
and in following the standard template recommended by the Guidance is
mixed.  The most significant finding is the stunning failure of the new execu-
tive summary requirement to produce more comprehensible rulemaking infor-
mation.  Standard readability measures place the executive summaries at a
level of difficulty that would challenge even college graduates.  Moreover, ex-
ecutive summaries are, on average, even less readable than the remainder of
the rule preambles that they are supposed to make more accessible to a
broader audience.
* William G. McRoberts Research Professor in Administration of the Law, Cornell Law
School; Senior Researcher, Cornell eRulemaking Initiative (“CeRI”).  Special thanks go to: Gi-
ancarlo Lee, Dr. Veronica Maidel, and Andrew Lai for their work obtaining the data and statisti-
cal analyses; Cornell Law research librarians Matthew M. Morrison and Margaret Ambrose, who
unearthed key bits of the history recounted in Part I; and David Pritzker, Deputy General Coun-
sel of ACUS, for sharing his encyclopedic knowledge of ACUS and the results of his persistent
digging into its past.
** Adjunct Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; CeRI Executive Director and Senior
Researcher.
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Still, some bright spots appear in this generally gloomy picture, as some
agencies (or parts of agencies) have become better at producing readable exec-
utive summaries.  After speculating about why efforts to “legislate” more com-
prehensible rulemaking documents persistently fail, this Article urges ACUS
to pursue its commitment to broader rulemaking participation by studying
successful—and unsuccessful—agency practices in this area.  The goal should
be to identify best practices and make informed and practicable recommenda-
tions for producing rulemaking materials that interested members of the pub-
lic could actually understand.
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INTRODUCTION
“It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made
by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that
they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be
understood.
—Alexander Hamilton (1788)1
“The public notice giving function of the Federal Register re-
quires, at a minimum, that each rulemaking document be
intelligible.”
—Administrative Committee of
the Federal Register (1976)2
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 344 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
2 Clarity of Rulemaking Documents in the Federal Register, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,623, 56,623
(Dec. 29, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 Final Rule].
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ACUS believes in rulemaking.  Fifteen of the thirty-two recom-
mendations and statements made since the 2010 ACUS revival3 deal
directly with rulemaking or with issues of particular importance to
rulemaking.4  ACUS also believes that broad public participation in
rulemaking matters.  In fact, ACUS recommendations have urged
that:
• Agencies consider “using social media tools to raise the visibil-
ity of rulemakings,”5 as well as “to inform and educate the pub-
lic about agency activities, their rulemaking process in general,
and specific rulemakings”;6
• Agencies recognize that “raising awareness among missing
stakeholders (those directly affected by the proposed rule who
are historically unlikely to participate in the traditional com-
ment process) . . . will require new outreach strategies”;7
• Agency websites be designed to “efficiently enable the public
to retrieve all available information . . . about . . . ongoing
rulemakings,”8 and “improve access for persons who have
faced barriers to effectively participating in rulemaking in the
past”;9 and
• Regulations.gov (the federal government rulemaking portal)
provide information “explaining what types of comments are
most beneficial and listing best practices for parties submitting
comments.”10
3 See History, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., https://www.acus.gov/history (last visited Sept. 1,
2015).
4 In addition to the recommendations cited below, infra notes 5–21, see ACUS Recom- R
mendation 2013-6, Remand Without Vacatur, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,272 (Dec. 17, 2013); ACUS State-
ment #18, Improving the Timeliness of OIRA Regulatory Review, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17,
2013); ACUS Recommendation 2013-2, Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent Regulatory Agen-
cies, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,355 (July 10, 2013); ACUS Recommendation 2012-4, Paperwork Reduction
Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,808 (Aug. 10, 2012); ACUS Recommendation 2012-2, Midnight Rules, 77
Fed. Reg. 47,802, 47,802 (Aug. 10, 2012).
5 ACUS Recommendation 2011-8, Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg.
2264, 2265 (Jan. 17, 2012).
6 ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269,
76,270 (Jan. 17, 2012).
7 Id. at 76,271.
8 ACUS Recommendation 2011-8, 77 Fed. Reg. at 2265.
9 Id.
10 ACUS Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,791, 48,791
(Aug. 9, 2011).
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In a series of recommendations, ACUS has sought to highlight
“‘best practices’ designed to increase the opportunities for public par-
ticipation”11 and understanding in rulemaking, including:
• Posting all comments in the online docket;12
• Incorporating in the online docket “all studies and reports on
which the proposal for rulemaking draws, as soon as
practicable”;13
• Indexing rulemaking dockets “at an appropriate level of de-
tail,”14 noting that the rulemaking record “plays an essential
role in informing the public of potential agency action and in
improving the public’s ability to understand and participate in
agency decisionmaking”;15
• Providing, “particularly for lengthy regulations, a section-by-
section analysis in the preamble in which the organization . . .
corresponds to the organization of the final rules themselves”;16
• Presenting information about the applicability of regulatory
analysis requirements in the form of a clear and easy-to-under-
stand chart;17
• Communicating information about agencies’ use of science “in
a manner that is clear to the general public”18 and that gives
“members of the public . . . access to the information necessary
to reproduce or assess the agency’s technical or scientific
conclusions”;19
• Ensuring that materials incorporated by reference in proposed
and final rules “be reasonably available both to regulated and
other interested parties”;20 and
• Adjusting ex parte communications policies to avoid the possi-
bility “that certain people or groups may have, or be perceived
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 ACUS Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg.
48,789, 48,790 (Aug. 9, 2011).
14 ACUS Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking,
78 Fed. Reg. 41,358, 41,360 (July 10, 2013).
15 Id. at 41,358.
16 ACUS Recommendation 2014-3, Guidance in the Rulemaking Process, 79 Fed. Reg.
35,992, 35,993 (June 25, 2014).
17 See ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,801, 47,801–02 (Aug. 10, 2012).
18 ACUS Recommendation 2013-3, Science in the Administrative Process, 78 Fed. Reg.
41,357, 41,358 (July 10, 2013).
19 Id.
20 ACUS Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2258
(Jan. 17, 2012).
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to have, greater access to agency personnel [during rulemak-
ing] than others.”21
The concern that the rulemaking process and its outputs should
be accessible to “ordinary” people as well as to large regulated firms is
not a new development for ACUS.  In 2013, an ACUS recommenda-
tion remarked: “The Conference has consistently supported full and
effective public participation in rulemaking.”22  Indeed, as Part I ex-
plains, ACUS’s very first set of recommendations included two re-
markably ambitious efforts to make rulemaking documents more
comprehensible to the public and to give historically under-
represented stakeholders a meaningful voice in the comment
process.23
Yet, as Professor Richard Pierce’s contribution to this special is-
sue points out,24 studies of rulemaking continue to reveal that large
regulated firms participate more extensively—and more effectively—
than other types of stakeholders or members of the general public.25
The Authors of this Article are part of a university research group—
the Cornell eRulemaking Initiative (“CeRI”)—that does action re-
search using Web 2.0 and other new technologies to support broader,
better public participation in rulemaking (the RegulationRoom pro-
ject).26  Seven years of experience working with federal agencies in
live rulemakings has convinced the Authors that Professor Pierce is
correct: the current rulemaking process, despite its formal promises of
21 ACUS Recommendation 2014-4, “Ex Parte” Communications in Informal Rulemaking,
79 Fed. Reg. 35,993, 35,994 (June 25, 2014).
22 ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269,
76,270 n.5 (Jan. 17, 2012).
23 See infra Part I.
24 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Administrative Conference and Empirical Research, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1564 (2015).
25 Id. at 104, 106.  A large literature documents that the notice-and-comment process tends
to be dominated by a limited range of mostly corporate participants. See, e.g., Steven J. Balla &
Benjamin M. Daniels, Information Technology and Public Commenting on Agency Regulations,
1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 46, 50–51 (2007); Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking:
Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 951, 958 (2006); see also CORNELIUS M. KERWIN &
SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE
POLICY 193–95 (4th ed. 2011) (summarizing studies that find business interest dominance, al-
though querying whether the participation gap between business and other interests might be
narrowing).
26 Information about CeRI and the RegulationRoom project can be found at http://
www.lawschool.cornell.edu/ceri/ and at http://regulationroom.org/, respectively.  The results of
CeRI’s public participation research to date is summarized in CYNTHIA R. FARINA & MARY J.
NEWHART, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, RULEMAKING 2.0: UNDERSTANDING AND GET-
TING BETTER PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (2013), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/
files/Rulemaking%202%200.pdf.
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transparency and broad participation rights, routinely and systemati-
cally disadvantages consumers, small business owners, local and tribal
government entities, nongovernmental organizations, and similar
kinds of stakeholders, as well as members of the general public.  Many
of the factors Professor Pierce discusses—e.g., collective action
problems and inequalities in access and resources27—seem largely be-
yond the ability of ACUS to help agencies remediate.  From our on-
the-ground perspective, however, one of the most persistent and per-
nicious contributors to rulemaking’s “bias” in favor of large regulated
firms is a problem that lies completely within the rulemaking agency’s
control.
To illustrate this problem, imagine that the Department of Trans-
portation (“DOT”) publishes the following in the Federal Register as
its Notice of a Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) on “Enhanced Air-
line Passenger Protections”:
The most pressing air passenger problem right now is that
consumers cannot tell what the total cost of air transporta-
tion will be, including ancillary fees, before deciding to buy.
This prevents comparison shopping across airlines.  Our pro-
posed fee transparency rules would make airlines disclose all
fees at the point of sale, so travelers know the total cost of
their airline ticket with no surprises later.
Also, the new rules would substantially increase the amount
paid to air travelers when they are involuntarily bumped off
flights.  The new rules will also allow passengers to cancel
their reservation within twenty-four hours without penalty
on non-refundable tickets.  They will prohibit price increases
once a ticket has been bought.  They will require airlines to
tell passengers about flight status changes in a more timely
fashion.
The proposal also expands the tarmac delay rule that went
into effect in April.  Foreign airlines operating at U.S. air-
ports would have to develop contingency plans for tarmac
delays and publish them to their websites.  The rule also
would be expanded to small and non-hub airports for U.S.
carriers.
DOT is currently considering the new rules and anyone may
comment on the proposed changes until September 23.  To
submit your comments, visit the Regulations.gov website.
27 Pierce, supra note 24, at 104–06. R
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Imagine further that this is all the NPRM says.  It does not contain the
actual regulatory text of the proposed changes; no cost-benefit or
other regulatory analyses are provided.
Of course, this hypothetical NPRM is purely hypothetical.  DOT
rulemakers understand that if they were to publish something so ab-
breviated, a federal court, on review of the final rule, would almost
certainly vacate and remand for failure to give notice adequate to al-
low meaningful comment.28  Accordingly, the NPRM actually pub-
lished in the Enhanced Airline Passenger Protections rulemaking
extensively discussed the agency’s legal authority, policy objectives,
factual assumptions, and possible alternative approaches.29  It identi-
fied areas where DOT sought more information.30  It provided compli-
ance details, such as specifics about how, when, and where airlines
would have to disclose baggage and other ancillary fees.31  It gave the
actual text of the proposed new regulation.32  It was accompanied by a
draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”),33 laying out the bases and
methodology of DOT’s cost and benefit projections.34
The point of imagining a drastically abbreviated NPRM is to ob-
serve how differently situated four potential commenters—a major
airline, the executive director of a small regional airport, a small travel
agency, and a frequent business traveler—are in the hypothetical ver-
sus the actual rulemaking.  The content of the imaginary NPRM is
general and conclusory, but it is equally accessible to all four potential
commenters.  To be sure, the major airline will still have a decided
edge in crafting comments.  As a repeat player, it knows the regula-
tory environment and history, and it has the resources to hire lawyers,
economists, and other regulatory experts able to make well-educated
guesses about the facts and arguments that might influence the
agency.35  Still, in this hypothetical scenario, the “notice” that initiates
public comment has given all four stakeholders the same information
about what DOT is proposing and why.
28 See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.3, 7.8 (5th ed.
2010).
29 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,318, 32,318–36 (June 8, 2010).
30 Id. at 32,329.
31 Id. at 32,323.
32 Id. at 32,336–41.
33 ECONOMETRICA, INC. & HDR DECISION ECONOMICS, PRELIMINARY REGULATORY
ANALYSIS: CONSUMER RULEMAKING NPRM: ENHANCING AIRLINE PASSENGER PROTECTIONS II
(2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2010-0140-0003 [hereinafter
PRELIMINARY REGULATORY ANALYSIS].
34 Id. at 26–28.
35 See Pierce, supra note 24, at 104–06. R
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By contrast, in the actual rulemaking, the major airline’s edge be-
comes a chasm.  The real NPRM was almost 26,000 words long (about
104 manuscript pages).36  Based on a common readability test, its text
was written at a reading level considerably above the ability of eighty
percent of adults in the U.S.37  By comparison, the hypothetical
NPRM above contains 207 words and tests at a readability level com-
fortably within accepted guidelines for general public comprehensibil-
ity.38  The real RIA,39 attached to the NPRM, was an additional 35,000
words in the form of 107 single-spaced pages of text, tables, and
graphs.  Neither the length nor the readability level of the actual air-
line passenger rights materials were unusual.  Indeed, as demonstrated
by the examination of other rulemaking documents in Part II, the
NPRM was shorter and more readable than average.
To the major airline and its experts, the dense information in the
actual rulemaking documents is gold.  It enables them to create the
“long, well-crafted [comments], rich in data and analysis” of which
Professor Pierce speaks.40  But what about the other potential com-
menters?  The small regional airport director might be able wade
through rulemaking documents that are the length of many novels in
order to identify the parts relevant to her operations and write a re-
sponsive comment of modest length that expresses her concerns.  For
the average travel agent and frequent business traveler, however, the
information in the NPRM and RIA is about as accessible as if the
documents were written in hieroglyphics.  What these stakeholders
know about the rulemaking will likely remain as general and con-
clusory as what appears in the imaginary NPRM above—which was
created by paraphrasing articles about the rulemaking in USA Today
and CNN.41  Small wonder that these stakeholders submit comments
36 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. at 32,318–41.
37 The real NPRM text scored at an 11.8 grade level in the Flesch-Kincaid readability test.
According to the Department of Education National Adult Literacy Survey, 80% of U.S. adults
read below the tenth grade level. See infra text accompanying notes 201–218. R
38 The hypothetical NPRM scored at an 8.1 grade level. See infra text accompanying notes
201–18. R
39 PRELIMINARY REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 33. R
40 See Pierce, supra note 24, at 106. R
41 See David Grossman, 2010: The Year Airline Passengers Struck Back, USA TODAY
(Sept. 7, 2010, 2:06 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/travel/experts/grossman/2010-09-07-im
proving-air-travel-passenger-rights_N.htm; Marnie Hunter, Feds Propose New Airline Passenger
Protections, CNN (June 3, 2010, 10:12 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/06/02/airline.
passenger.protections/index.html.
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amounting to little more than “save us from irresponsible, deceptive
airlines.”42
This Article does not suggest that less information in rulemaking
is better.  Rather, its goal is to uncover a major cause of systematic
bias that hides in plain view: the length and complexity of rulemaking
documents make it possible for large regulated firms to submit the
sophisticated, highly detailed comments that rulemakers take seri-
ously.43  These characteristics simultaneously make it impossible for
most other types of stakeholders and members of the general public to
contribute more than “slogans that are more appropriate as bumper
stickers than as contributions to a decisionmaking process.”44
Part I briefly reprises the almost fifty-year history of efforts to
make rulemaking documents more accessible to ordinary people.  No-
tably, although the link between comprehensibility and public partici-
pation was clearly perceived at the outset, this connection was lost in
the “plain language” movement as time passed.45
Part II focuses on a recent effort in which this was rediscovered:
the 2012 instruction (“Executive Summary Guidance” or “Guidance”)
from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) that
“straightforward executive summaries” be included in preambles for
“lengthy or complex rules (both proposed and final).”46  This Article
presents the results of a novel empirical study of the executive sum-
maries included in rulemaking documents in the years before and af-
ter the Guidance.  Although some aspects of the new executive
42 Cf. Pierce, supra note 24, at 105 (noting that most comments will generally amount to R
nothing more than “slogans”).
43 See id. at 106.
44 Id. at 105.  As Professor Pierce points out, the Authors are on record as agreeing that
much of what currently constitutes the “public” part of public comments deserves little attention
from rulemakers. See id. at 106 n.34 (citing Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking vs. Democracy:
Judging and Nudging Public Participation That Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123,
139–44 (2012)).  The animating force of the RegulationRoom project is discovering how technol-
ogy and human support might change this.  Farina et al., supra, at 125.
45 This Article does not engage in the debate about precisely what plain language means
and what are the best methodologies for achieving comprehensible regulatory documents.  It
adopts the definition of David Mellinkoff, a pioneer in the U.S. movement to use clear, simple,
and brief language and sentence structure in legal drafting: “[P]lain language [is] an imprecise
expression of hope for improvement in the language of the law.” Plain language, MELLINKOFF’S
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE (1992); see also Douglas Martin, Obituaries, David
Mellinkoff, 85, Enemy of Legalese, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, at 37.
46 Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs, to
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Jan. 4, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/clarifying-regulatory-requirements_executive-summaries.pdf
[hereinafter Exec. Summ. Guidance].
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summary practice are very positive, the actual impact of the require-
ments has perversely been to create even less comprehensible text
about the rulemaking.
Part III concludes by speculating about possible explanations for
the persistent problem of rulemaking documents that, as a practical
matter, provide useful information to only a small fraction of the indi-
viduals and entities affected by proposed and final rules.  Rather than
proposing yet another set of comprehensibility directives, this Article
urges ACUS to make the problem a focus of its commitment to care-
ful research into actual agency behaviors, with the goal of developing
recommendations that disseminate ideas and practices with a track re-
cord of success.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR COMPREHENSIBLE
RULEMAKING DOCUMENTS
“Mrs. Knauer [Richard Nixon’s Special Assistant for Con-
sumer Affairs] observed that the Federal Register ‘is abso-
lutely incomprehensible to the average consumer.’
The President commented ‘Or to anyone else.’”47
On October 22, 1968, Betty Furness, Lyndon Johnson’s Special
Assistant for Consumer Affairs, wrote to Chairman Jerre Williams of
the fledgling ACUS.48  She proposed an area of investigation for
ACUS’s initial set of recommendations:
Since entering government service, I have become concerned
about the lack of consumer involvement in government rule
making affecting consumers.  Day by day, agencies of our
government fill the Federal Register with proposed and final
rules, orders, and policies which directly and importantly af-
fect consumers.  Yet these publications go virtually unno-
ticed by consumers.  More importantly, consumers are not
participating in the establishment of the rules which are sup-
posed to reflect the interest of the consumer.
. . . .
Obviously, the consumer is in a poor position to attempt to
comprehend the legal and technical language comprising the
typical Federal Register notice—if, indeed, he knows of the
existence of the Federal Register.  The consumer does not
47 Preparation and Transmittal of Documents Generally: Summary Statements and High-
lights Listing, 36 Fed. Reg. 5203, 5203 (Mar. 18, 1971) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 16).
48 Letter from Betty Furness, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs, to
Hon. Jerre S. Williams, Chairman, Admin. Conference of the U.S. (Oct. 22, 1968) [hereinafter
Furness Memo] (on file with The George Washington Law Review).
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have the benefit of the professional advice available to indus-
try through house counsel, trade associations, trade papers,
Washington counsel, etc.  In most cases he has neither the
time nor the collateral library materials to allow him to keep
track of developments.
. . . .
Essentially, what I am proposing is that there be established
a regular publication serving the needs of consumers in the
same way that the Federal Register serves the needs of the
regulated industry—a “Consumer’s Federal Register” if you
will.  I think it would serve consumers’ needs if the major
issues, culled from each proposed and final rule directly and
importantly affecting consumers, were summarized in such a
publication with brief explanation of how the consumer
could register his views or obtain more information from the
agency issuing the rule.49
ACUS acted swiftly on Furness’s concern.  Citing “a widespread
public need which is not now met by the ‘Federal Register’ or by
agency and private publications of a more specialized nature,” the
Conference recommended:
A consumer bulletin should be established on an experimen-
tal basis.  It should extract and paraphrase in popular terms
the substance of Federal agency actions of significant interest
to consumers.  Initially, the bulletin should concentrate on
49 Furness Memo, supra note 48.  Furness had been vocal in arguing that industry prima- R
rily and disproportionately benefited from existing rulemaking practices; for example, in an ear-
lier memo to Joseph Califano, President Johnson’s top domestic advisor, she wrote:
It has been over 30 years since the Supreme Court forced the Executive and Legis-
lative branches of the Federal Government to give industry better notice of, and
opportunity for participation in rule-making (Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935)).  During that time the Federal Register Act, the Administrative
Procedure Act and the daily Federal Register itself have afforded industry “due
process,” and industry has availed itself of the opportunities provided by law.
However, these procedures and enactments were not really designed to, nor do
they perform the function of providing the consumer-voter with that notice suffi-
cient to stimulate him to participate in the making of rules which may affect him
directly.
Memorandum from Betty Furness, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs, to
Joseph Califano, Consumers and the Federal Register (Stimulating Citizens to Participate in
Governmental Decisions) (Aug. 6, 1968) [hereinafter Califano Memo] (on file with The George
Washington Law Review).  Ms. Furness initially sought an Executive Order calling for the crea-
tion of a weekly list of consumer issues. See Califano Memo, supra.  Subsequent discussions
between White House advisors and ACUS leadership produced an agreement that Furness
would formally request ACUS to take up the matter. See Memorandum from Jerre S. Williams,
Chairman, Admin. Conference of the U.S., to Members of the Council (Sept. 18, 1968) (on file
with The George Washington Law Review); see also Furness Memo, supra note 48. R
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items published in the “Federal Register,” but as it gains
public acceptance, it should be broadened to include materi-
als secured from other sources.50
The goal, said the recommendation, was to “not only disseminate in-
formation, but also stimulate public response.”51
When Chairman Williams initially responded to Furness’s letter,
he had explained:
You will be pleased to know that this proposal bears a sub-
stantial relationship to other matters that the Conference is
now engaged in studying.  The need for establishing means
by which the unorganized public can be aware of govern-
mental actions which affect them and can be adequately rep-
resented in those governmental activities is the subject of
these other studies.  Thus, your proposal fits well with work
of the Administrative Conference already underway.52
This related work became “Representation of the Poor in Agency
Rulemaking of Direct Consequence to Them.”53  Adopted the same
day as the Consumer Bulletin Recommendation,54 this recommenda-
tion urged agencies to “engage more extensively in affirmative, self-
initiated efforts to ascertain directly from the poor their views with
respect to rulemaking that may affect them substantially.”55  It called
for “strong efforts, by use of existing as well as newly devised proce-
dures, to obtain information and opinion from those whose circum-
stances may not permit conventional participation in rulemaking
proceedings,” and it outlined specific steps agencies could take to in-
form the poor about rulemakings and elicit their comments.56
Within a year of the Consumer Bulletin Recommendation, Presi-
dent Richard Nixon, in a special message to Congress on consumer
50 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 68-4: CONSUMER BULLETIN 1
(1968), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/68-4.no-FR.pdf (emphasis added).
51 Id.
52 Letter from Jerre S. Williams, Chairman, Admin. Conference of the U.S., to Betty Fur-
ness, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs (Oct. 25, 1968) (on file with The
George Washington Law Review).
53 ACUS Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking of
Direct Consequence to Them, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-5 (1993).
54 RECOMMENDATION 68-4, supra note 50, http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/docu- R
ments/68-4.no-FR.pdf.
55 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-5.
56 Id.  These steps included paying “the personal expenses and wage losses incurred by
individuals incident to their participation in rulemaking” and creating an agency “People’s
Counsel,” an entity charged with “represent[ing] the interests of the poor in all Federal adminis-
trative rulemaking substantially affecting the poor.” Id.
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protection,57 said he was asking his Special Assistant for Consumer
Affairs to implement the idea that one industry newsletter had
dubbed “a ‘public’ version of the Federal Register.”58  Nixon explained
that “[t]he material [the new Consumer Bulletin] presents, which will
include notices of hearings, proposed and final rules and orders, and
other useful information, will be translated from its technical form into
language which is readily understandable by the layman.”59
A year later, the concern about inaccessibility of rulemaking doc-
uments was picked up by the Administrative Committee of the Fed-
eral Register (“ACFR”).60  On December 1, 1970, the ACFR issued
an NPRM that began with a refreshingly candid, if understated, ad-
mission: “Over the years many persons have pointed out that the Fed-
eral Register is a difficult document for the average layman to use.”61
Observing that “criticisms along this line have increased in the recent
past in direct proportion to the growing interest in consumer affairs,”
the ACFR proposed to require “a brief statement written in layman’s
language describing the contents” as part of most “documents submit-
ted for publication.”62  The final rule (“1971 rule”),63 issued three
months later, required the new “summary statement” to include the
name of the issuing agency, the “principal subject of the document,”
and “any important dates, such as [the] closing date for comments.”64
The preamble of the 1971 rule reiterated that the summary statement
57 The President’s Message to the Congress Outlining his Legislative Program, Oct. 30,
1969, 5 WEEKLY COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1516 (Nov. 3, 1969), http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2299 [hereinafter Nixon Message to Congress].
58 Plans to Help the Consumer, BROADCASTING, Dec. 2, 1968, at 49 (noting Betty Fur-
ness’s proposal to the conference) (on file with The George Washington Law Review).
59 Nixon Message to Congress, supra note 57, at 1521 (emphasis added).  Initially, the Con- R
sumer Bulletin was published by a new Office of Consumer Affairs located in the Executive
Office of the President. See id. at 1517–18.  The Office of Consumer Affairs was relocated into
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human Services), Exec.
Order No. 11,702, 38 Fed. Reg. 2957 (Jan. 31, 1973), and published the Consumer News with a
supplement called the Consumer Register until at least the late 1970s. See, e.g., U.S. Office of
Consumer Affairs, CONSUMER NEWS, June 15, 1979.
60 The Administrative Committee of the Federal Register is established by statute and
consists of “the Archivist of the United States[,] . . . an officer of the Department of Justice
designated by the Attorney General, and the Public Printer . . . .”  44 U.S.C. § 1506 (2012).  The
Director of the Federal Register serves as Secretary. Id.
61 Preparation and Transmittal of Documents: Proposed Summary Statements, 35 Fed.
Reg. 18,297, 18,297 (Dec. 1, 1970) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 16).
62 Id. (emphasis added).  Documents that were “nonsubstantive or editorial [in] nature”
would be excluded from the proposal. Id. at 18,298.
63 Preparation and Transmittal of Documents Generally: Summary Statements and High-
lights Listing, 36 Fed. Reg. 5203, 5204 (Mar. 18, 1971) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 16).
64 Id.
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was to be “written in layman’s language,” although this phrase did not
appear in the text of the proposed rule itself.65
The examples included in the 1971 rule underscore how brief the
new summary was expected to be,66 and the ACFR admitted that
many commenters had pressed it to “go much further” and require “a
clear, concise explanation of the substance of the document and the
major issues involved.”67  The ACFR refused on grounds that this ex-
ceeded the scope of what it had proposed, but said it had become
“convinced that further efforts to improve the Federal Register neces-
sitate actions to improve the individual documents submitted for pub-
lication therein.”68  The ACFR directed agencies’ attention to the
legislative history of 5 U.S.C. § 553 (the notice and comment rulemak-
ing section of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)),69 which, it
said, “indicates that Congress intended that each proposed rulemaking
document would clearly state the issues involved.”70  It urged each
agency to “review its rulemaking program to [e]nsure that each docu-
ment is written in the clearest possible manner” and recommended
“that each document contain an adequate preamble explaining the
significance of the action taken or being proposed.” Whenever the
length of the preamble warrants, the first paragraph should be a sum-
mary of the substance of the document and the major issues in-
volved.”71  In a nod to the Consumer Bulletin Recommendation,72 it
pointed out that “a summary paragraph in each document clearly writ-
65 See id. at 5203–04.
66 Id. at 5204.  The examples given were: “DETERGENTS—proposed FTC labeling and
advertising requirements for synthetic detergents—comment period ends 4-19-71; public hearing
4-26-71.  COAL MINE SAFETY—Interior Department procedures to assess civil penalties for
violations—effective 1-16-71.” Id.
67 Id. at 5203.
68 Id.
69 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
70 Preparation and Transmittal of Documents Generally, 36 Fed. Reg. at 5203 (emphasis
added).  The ACFR relied on language in the Senate Committee Report that courts eventually
used to justify expanded notice requirements: “Agency notice must be sufficient to fairly apprise
interested parties of the issues involved, so that they may present responsive data or argument
relating thereto.” Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 16 (1945); see, e.g., Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v.
EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 1977) (using “sufficient to fairly apprise all interested parties”
test for adequacy of rulemaking notice).  Ironically, these requirements contributed to the kinds
of preambles that are incomprehensible to most stakeholders.
71 Preparation and Transmittal of Documents Generally, 36 Fed. Reg. at 5203 (emphasis
added).
72 RECOMMENDATION 68-4, supra note 50, http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/docume R
nts/68-4.no-FR.pdf; see also Preparation and Transmittal of Documents Generally, 36 Fed. Reg.
at 5203 (specifically discussing President Nixon’s conversation with Ms. Knauer about the Fed-
eral Register being “absolutely incomprehensible to the average consumer”).
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-4-5\GWN510.txt unknown Seq: 15 19-OCT-15 10:58
1372 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1358
ten in layman’s terms would facilitate the publication of a separate
consumer oriented publication of the type recommended by [ACUS]
in 1969.”73
In the preamble to the 1971 rule, the ACFR exhorted readers to
bring to the attention of the Federal Register any rulemaking docu-
ments that were not clearly written.74  It turned out that the ACFR
was serious about this seemingly quixotic request.  In 1976, it issued a
second NPRM, entitled Clarity of Explanatory Material,75 “intended
to improve the clarity of documents published in the Federal Register
since the present preamble requirement has not resulted in clear, sim-
ple explanations of rulemaking documents.”76  The final rule (“1976
rule”) amended 1 C.F.R. § 18.12 to provide:
Preamble Requirements.
(a) Each agency submitting a proposed or final rule docu-
ment for publication shall prepare a preamble which will in-
form the reader, who is not an expert in the subject area, of
the basis and purpose for the rule or proposal.”77
It also now required the summary that commenters had sought in the
1971 rulemaking:
(b) The preamble shall . . . contain the following informa-
tion:
. . . Summary: Brief statements, in simple language, of: (i) the
action being taken; (ii) the circumstances which created the
need for the action; and (iii) the intended effect of the
action.78
The ACFR was utterly unimpressed by one federal agency com-
ment complaining that “the proposed approach . . . reduces everything
for lay public consumption.”79  The “public notice giving function of
the Federal Register,” the ACFR reiterated, “requires, at a minimum,
that each rulemaking document be intelligible.”80  The 1976 amend-
ments remain in effect today.81
73 Preparation and Transmittal of Documents Generally, 36 Fed. Reg. at 5203 (emphasis
added).
74 Id.
75 Preparation of Federal Register Documents: Clarity of Explanatory Material, 41 Fed.
Reg. 32,861, 32,861 (Aug. 5, 1976) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 18).
76 1976 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 56,623. R
77 Id. at 56,624 (emphasis added); see also 1 C.F.R. § 18.12 (2015).
78 1976 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 56,624–25 (emphasis added); see also 1 C.F.R. § 18.12. R
79 1976 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 56,623–24 R
80 Id. at 56,623.
81 See 1 C.F.R. § 18.12.
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These early comprehensibility efforts clearly recognized the di-
rect connection between understandable information about proposed
rules and public participation in rulemaking.82  However, over the
next forty years, this connection was obscured by other policy justifi-
cations for plain-language drafting of regulatory documents.
In 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12,044
(“Carter Order”).83  The Carter Order, which established many of the
elements that now constitute centralized regulatory review, began:
“Regulations shall be as simple and clear as possible.”84  The Order
instructed that “[a]gencies shall give the public an early and meaning-
ful opportunity to participate in the development of agency regula-
tions.”85  However, creating comprehensible rulemaking documents
was not among the items included in this section on public participa-
tion.86  A subsequent section did expressly instruct agencies to deter-
mine that “significant” regulations are “written in plain English,” but
the justification focused on increasing compliance, not participation.87
President Ronald Reagan revoked the Carter Order in 1981, re-
placing it with the more extensive regulatory review requirements of
Executive Order 12,291 (“Reagan Order”).88  The Reagan Order,
which remained in effect during the George H.W. Bush presidency,
contained no reference to plain language or comprehensibility, and it
referred only briefly to public participation.89
Attention to comprehensible regulatory documents revived dur-
ing the Clinton Administration.  In this period, which included the
82 See supra notes 48–81 and accompanying text. R
83 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979).
84 Id. § 1, 3 C.F.R. at 152 (emphasis added).
85 Id. § 2(c), 3 C.F.R. at 153.
86 Id.  Instead, this section directed agencies to “consider” using “advance notice of pro-
posed rulemaking,” “holding open conferences or public hearings,” publishing notices in places
“likely to be read by those affected,” and providing minimum sixty day comment periods. Id.
87 Id. § 2(d)(5), 3 C.F.R. at 153–54 (noting that a regulation should be “understandable to
those who must comply with it” (emphasis added)).  Carter also signed into law the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521
(2012)), which, among other things, requires agencies to certify that requests for information in a
proposed rule are “written using plain, coherent, and unambiguous terminology and [are] under-
standable to those who are to respond.”  44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(3)(D) (2012).
88 Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 10, 3 C.F.R. 127, 134 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
795 (1982).
89 Id. § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. at 130 (requiring agency to determine, in the case of final major
rules, “that the factual conclusions upon which the rule is based have substantial support in the
agency record, viewed as a whole, with full attention to public comments in general and the
comments of persons directly affected by the rule in particular”).
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creation of the National Partnership for Reinventing Government,90
plain language was linked with lowering the societal costs of regula-
tion.  President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 (“Clinton Order”),
which superseded the Reagan Order in September 1993,91 instructed:
“Each agency shall draft its regulations to be simple and easy to un-
derstand, with the goal of minimizing the potential for uncertainty and
litigation arising from such uncertainty.”92  In addition, reflecting sensi-
tivity to criticism that OIRA—tasked with review of agency rulemak-
ing93—covertly favored anti-regulatory interests,94 the Clinton Order
linked plain language with new transparency of the regulatory review
process.95  Agencies were instructed to “[i]dentify for the public, in a
complete, clear, and simple manner,” the substantive changes made
during OIRA review.96  Both the agency and OIRA were directed to
use “plain, understandable language” in “[a]ll information provided to
the public.”97  The Clinton Order did revive the Carter Administra-
tion’s emphasis on public participation.  It directed agencies to “pro-
vide the public with meaningful participation in the regulatory
process” and “a meaningful opportunity to comment,” but the only
specific instruction toward these ends was the reappearance of the
minimum sixty-day comment period.98
Early in his second term, President Clinton issued a memoran-
dum to executive departments and agencies entitled Plain Language
in Government Writing (“Plain Language Memorandum”).99  This
90 John Kamensky, A Brief History of Vice President Al Gore’s National Partnership for
Reinventing Government During the Administration of President Bill Clinton 1993–2001, NAT’L
P’SHIP FOR REINVENTING GOV’T (Jan. 12, 2001), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/whoweare/his
toryofnpr.html.
91 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 11, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 802, 806 (2012).
92 Id. at § 1, 3 C.F.R. at 640 (emphasis added).  Similarly, Executive Order 12,988, entitled
Civil Justice Reform, focused on good drafting practices to “reduce needless litigation.”  Exec.
Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729, 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996).  Section three, entitled Principles to
Enact Legislation and Promulgate Regulations Which Do Not Unduly Burden the Federal Court
System, directs the use of “clear language” in proposed statutes or regulations in the context of a
list of specific substantive provisions, including preemption, retroactivity, and impact on existing
statutes or regulations. Id. at 4730–31.
93 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. at 640.
94 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 191–92 (1986) (noting potential for anti-regula-
tory bias of the Office of Management and Budget, OIRA’s umbrella agency).
95 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(E), 3 C.F.R. at 646.
96 Id. § 6(a)(3)(E)(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 646.
97 Id. §§ 6(a)(3)(F), 6(b)(5), 3 C.F.R. at 646, 648 (emphasis added).
98 Id. § 6(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 644.
99 Memorandum on Plain Language in Government Writing, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,885 (June 10,
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memorandum, which is still in effect, remains the broadest effort to
date to mandate comprehensible regulatory documents.  It directs ex-
ecutive agencies to “use plain language in all new documents [written
after October 1, 1998], other than regulations, that explain how to ob-
tain a benefit or service or how to comply with a requirement you
administer or enforce.”100  After January 1, 1999, the directive ex-
panded coverage to “all proposed and final rulemaking documents
published in the Federal Register.”101  The Plain Language Memoran-
dum closed with the President “ask[ing] the independent agencies to
comply with these directives.”102
Like the Clinton Order,103 the Plain Language Memorandum jus-
tifies comprehensibility on grounds of accountability and efficiency:
“The Federal Government’s writing must be in plain language.  By
using plain language, we send a clear message about what the Govern-
ment is doing, what it requires, and what services it offers.  Plain lan-
guage saves the Government and the private sector time, effort, and
money.”104
The Clinton Administration subsequently issued detailed compli-
ance guidance,105 now incorporated in the Federal Register Document
Drafting Handbook (“Handbook”).106  The Handbook generally fol-
lows the Plain Language Memorandum’s rationale for comprehensi-
bility, with the addition of a reference to trust: “Remember, plain
language saves the Government and the private sector time, effort and
money. . . . Readable regulations help the public find requirements
quickly and understand them easily.  They increase compliance,
1998) [hereinafter Plain-Language Memorandum]. See also John Kamensky, Reinvention in the
Second Clinton-Gore Administration: Changing the Culture of Government Agencies—
1997–2001, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR REINVENTING GOV’T (Jan. 12, 2001), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu
/npr/whoweare/historypart4.html (“[A]gencies are now required to communicate in clear lan-
guage with their customers.”).
100 Plain-Language Memorandum, supra note 99, at 31,885. R
101 Id.
102 Id.  For an example of an independent agency that heeded this invitation, see the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission’s webpage, Federal Plain Writing Mandates, U.S. NUCLEAR REG.
COMM’N. (June 5, 2015), http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/open/plain-writing/fed-mandates.
html.
103 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 646.
104 Plain-Language Memorandum, supra note 99, at 31,885. R
105 How to Comply with the President’s Memo on Plain Language, PLAINLANGUAGE.GOV
(July 1998), http://www.plainlanguage.gov/howto/guidelines/PresMemoGuidelines.cfm.
106 See NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, FEDERAL
REGISTER DOCUMENT DRAFTING HANDBOOK iii (rev. ed. Oct. 1998), http://www.archives.gov/
federal-register/write/handbook/ddh.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL REGISTER DOCUMENT DRAFT-
ING HANDBOOK].
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strengthen enforcement, and decrease mistakes, frustration, phone
calls, appeals, and distrust of government.  Everyone gains.”107
Everyone may indeed gain from plain language, but the originally
perceived link between comprehensibility of rulemaking documents
and the ability of the public to participate in the rulemaking process
remained lost.
George W. Bush amended the Clinton Order twice.108  However,
the instruction to draft regulations that are “simple to understand”
remained unaltered.109
President Obama further supplemented the Clinton Order by is-
suing Executive Order 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review (“Obama Order”).110  In the Obama Order, comprehensibility
reappears as one of the “General Principles of Regulation”: “Our reg-
ulatory system . . . must ensure that regulations are accessible, consis-
tent, written in plain language, and easy to understand.”111  Section two,
devoted specifically to public participation, directs agencies to take
several actions to ensure “the open exchange of information and per-
spectives among State, local, and tribal officials, experts in relevant
disciplines, affected stakeholders in the private sector, and the public
as a whole.”112  These actions include a sixty-day minimum comment
period and “timely online access to the rulemaking docket . . . includ-
ing relevant scientific and technical findings, in an open format that
can be easily searched and downloaded.”113  Conspicuously lacking,
however, is a requirement that agencies enable public participation by
producing rulemaking documents that laypeople can understand.114
Congress finally entered the picture by passing the Plain Writing
Act of 2010 (“PWA”).115  Unlike the presidential initiatives, which for-
mally bind only executive departments and agencies,116 the PWA ap-
107 Id. at MRR-1.
108 See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2763–65 (Jan. 23, 2007); Exec. Order No.
13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385, 9385–86 (Feb. 28, 2002).
109 See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. at 2763–65; Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 9385–86.
110 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816
(2012).
111 Id. § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 215 (emphasis added).
112 Id. § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 216.
113 Id. § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. at 216.
114 See id.
115 Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-274, 124 Stat. 2861 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 301
(2012)).
116 See VIVIAN S. CHU & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20846, EXECUTIVE
ORDERS: ISSUANCE, MODIFICATION, AND REVOCATION 1–2 (2014).
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plies to independent agencies as well.117  Echoing presidential
statements of purpose, the PWA aims “to improve the effectiveness
and accountability of Federal agencies to the public by promoting
clear Government communication that the public can understand and
use.”118  Most of the PWA’s requirements are procedural.  Agencies
must designate one or more senior officials to oversee plain writing
initiatives, create a plain writing section of their websites, establish
training and compliance processes, and publish annual reports.119  The
substantive heart of the PWA is the requirement that, by October
2011, agencies must “use plain writing in every covered document,”120
a term defined by an oddly phrased set of criteria that explicitly ex-
cludes regulations,121 but does—according to OIRA’s 2011 Final Gui-
dance on Implementing the Plain Writing Act of 2010 (“PWA
Guidance”)—include the preambles to proposed and final rules.122
117 Somewhat confusingly, the PWA applies to “agencies,” defined as “an Executive
agency, as defined under section 105 or title 5, United States Code.”  5 U.S.C. § 301 sec. 3(1).
Section 105 in turn defines executive agencies as “an Executive department, a Government cor-
poration, and an independent establishment.”  5 U.S.C. § 105.
118 5 U.S.C. § 301 sec. 2.
119 Id. § 301 sec. 4–5.
120 Id. § 301 sec. 4(b) (emphasis added).
121 Id. § 301 sec. 3(2)(C).
122 See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, Office of Info. and Reg. Af-
fairs, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, Final Guidance on Implementing the Plain Writing
Act 5 (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-
15.pdf [hereinafter PWA Guidance].  Whether rulemaking preambles are categorically included
depends on how you interpret the statutory definition:
The term “covered document”—
(A) means any document that—
(i) is necessary for obtaining any Federal Government benefit or service or filing
taxes;
(ii) provides information about any Federal Government benefit or service; or
(iii) explains to the public how to comply with a requirement the Federal Govern-
ment administers or enforces;
(B) includes (whether in paper or electronic form) a letter, publication, form, no-
tice, or instruction; and
(C) does not include a regulation.
5 U.S.C. § 301 sec. 3(2). The PWA Guidance reads (A) and (B) as disjunctive, i.e., a covered
document could be any of the three types in (A) or a letter, publication, form, notice, or instruc-
tion.  PWA Guidance, supra, at 5.  On this reading, NPRMs and final rules are categorically
covered documents except for the exclusion of the actual new regulatory text.  If, however, (A)
and (B) are read as conjunctive (because of the “and” that follows the clause in (B)), then it
seems that coverage of rulemaking documents depends on whether their particular content falls
into one of the subsection (A) types.  It is hard to imagine many documents described in (A) that
would not take the form of “a letter, publication, form, notice, or instruction” in paper or elec-
tronic form—but, as a practical matter—who has the incentive (and standing) to contest OIRA’s
expansive interpretation?
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The PWA Guidance reminds executive agencies that the Clinton Or-
der123 and the Obama Order124 already require them to write regula-
tions in a manner that is “simple and easy to understand.”125  It also
contains an expanded list of the “many benefits” of “[c]lear and sim-
ple communication.”126
[P]lain writing can:
• improve public understanding of government communications;
• save money and increase efficiency;
• reduce the need for the public to seek clarification from agency
staff;
• improve public understanding of agency requirements and
thereby assist the public in complying with them;
• reduce resources spent on enforcement;
• improve public understanding of agency forms and applications
and thereby assist the public in completing them; and
• reduce the number of errors that are made and thus the
amount of time and effort that the agency and the public need
to devote to correcting those errors.127
Facilitating public rulemaking participation still has not made the
list.128
Finally, more than forty years after Betty Furness’s letter,129 the
link between public rulemaking participation and comprehensibility of
rulemaking documents was rediscovered in OIRA’s January 2012 Ex-
ecutive Summary Guidance.130  Reiterating the Obama Order’s call
for regulations to “‘be adopted through a process that involves public
participation,’ including an ‘open exchange of information and per-
spectives,’”131 the Guidance observed: “Public participation cannot oc-
cur if the requirements of rules are unduly complex and if members of
the public are unable to obtain a clear sense of the content of those
123 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(12), 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1993).
124 Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 4, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
816, 817 (2012).
125 PWA Guidance, supra note 122, at 5 n.5. R
126 Id. at 1.
127 Id. at 1–2.
128 The PWA Guidance began in a promising manner: “In his January 21, 2009, Memoran-
dum on Transparency and Open Government, President Obama emphasized the importance of
establishing ‘a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration.’  Plain writing is
indispensable to achieving these goals.” Id. at 1.  However, the indispensability of plain writing
to public participation remains inchoate, with no further mention of the relationship in the six-
page memorandum. See id. 1–6.
129 See Furness Memo, supra note 48, at 1. R
130 Exec. Summ. Guidance, supra note 46, at 1. R
131 Id. (quoting the Obama Order).
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requirements.”132  Accordingly, it instructs agencies to include
“straightforward executive summaries” in the preambles for “lengthy
and complex rules (both proposed and final).”133  The next Part exam-
ines the success of this instruction.
II. “STRAIGHTFORWARD EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES”:
A PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL STUDY
“Information has value only when it’s being read and
understood.”134
This empirical study examines executive summary practice in the
two years before and after OIRA’s Executive Summary Guidance.
The Guidance, issued on January 4, 2012, was “effective immedi-
ately.”135  However, the study uses February 1, 2012, as the breakpoint
in the dataset in order to allow a reasonable period of time for agen-
cies’ internal drafting process to reflect the new executive summary
requirement.  This breakpoint also recognizes the lag time between
when an agency submits a completed rule document to the Federal
Register and when that document is actually published.
The study uses four factors to assess whether post-Guidance exec-
utive summaries have provided the public with “a clear sense of the
content”136 of proposed and final rules:
INCIDENCE.  How many proposed and final rulemaking docu-
ments actually include an executive summary?  How are agencies in-
terpreting the instruction that executive summaries should be
provided for “lengthy or complex rules?”137
LENGTH.  How long are executive summaries?  The Executive
Summary Guidance provides a “[s]uggested [t]emplate” that contem-
plates “generally 3–4 pages of a double-spaced Word document maxi-
mum, although unusually complex or lengthy regulatory actions may
require longer executive summaries.”138
FORMAT.  Has the Executive Summary Guidance standardized
the structure of executive summaries?  The Guidance template is
formatted with three titled sections: (1) “Purpose of the Regulatory
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 Id.
134 Jakob Nielsen, Do Government Agencies and Non-Profits Get ROI from Usability?,
NIELSEN NORMAN GROUP (Feb. 12, 2007), http://www.nngroup.com/articles/government-non-
profits-usability-roi/.
135 Exec. Summ. Guidance, supra note 46, at 1. R
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 2.
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Action,” (2) “Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulation Ac-
tion in Question,” and (3) “Costs and Benefits.”139  Are agencies fol-
lowing the template?
READABILITY.  How “readable” are executive summaries?  Para-
phrasing the Obama Order,140 the Executive Summary Guidance in-
structs that “regulations should be written clearly and simply” and
directs that the executive summaries be “straightforward.”141  The
study uses a common automated readability scoring method to pro-
vide a quantitative measure of readability.142  Admittedly, such meth-
ods give only a preliminary indicator of comprehensibility, but testing
methods that involve human readers are not practicable for a large
number of documents.143  Is there any evidence that the Executive
Summary Guidance has improved readability of executive summaries
among those agencies that had an executive summary practice in place
before the Guidance?  How readable are the executive summaries
produced by agencies for which the practice is new?  Are executive
summaries more readable than other parts of the rulemaking docu-
ments in which they appear?
Like the Obama Order it implements,144 the Guidance formally
applies only to executive departments and agencies.145  Nevertheless,
some independent agencies routinely submit to OIRA review and
even those who do not may still be attentive to presidential initiatives
and priorities.  Thus, the study also looked at the executive summary
practice of independent agencies.  Before discussing the results, a
description of how the dataset was created, and an overview of the
rulemaking documents in the four-year period of the study, are
provided.
A. The Dataset
The dataset was created by extracting from the Federal Register
all documents and associated metadata in the proposed rule and final
139 Id.
140 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816
(2012).
141 Exec. Summ. Guidance, supra note 46, at 1. R
142 See infra notes 203–10 and accompanying text. R
143 See infra notes 197–203 and accompanying text. R
144 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215.
145 The Obama Order defines its applicability by referring back to section 3(b) of the Clin-
ton Order, id. § 7(a), 3 C.F.R. at 217, which in turn refers to definitions of “agency” and “inde-
pendent regulatory agency” in the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) (2012).  Exec.
Order No. 12,866 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802, 803
(2012).
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rule categories, published between February 1, 2010, and January 31,
2014, inclusive.  This initial extraction generated 25,116 rulemaking
documents.  Then, numerous adjustments to the extracted data were
made.  Some of these adjustments corrected data entry errors in the
metadata.146  Many other corrections were required because the Fed-
eral Register’s categories include a wide range of documents beyond
actual notices of proposed or final rules.147  Using the “Type of Ac-
tion” field, the Authors culled documents that seemed unlikely to fall
within the scope of the Guidance.  This adjustment did not eliminate
issues of under-inclusiveness148 or over-inclusiveness,149 but it yielded
the most accuracy attainable without viewing and categorizing each
document by hand.  The final dataset contained 19,758 proposed or
final rulemaking documents.
It proved impossible reliably to determine how many rulemak-
ings these documents represented.  The touchstone for linking docu-
ments related to a specific rulemaking is supposedly the Regulatory
Identifier Number (“RIN”), a unique identifier that the Regulatory
Information Service Center (“RISC”) assigns to each “regulatory ac-
tion.”150  Unfortunately, only 62% of the documents (12,345 out of
19,758) have an entry in the RIN metadata field.151  This subset of
146 Metadata (data about data) are simply the descriptions of categories of data.  “Agency”
and “Department” are examples of metadata in the rulemaking database.  An example of a data
entry error is entering “Homeland Security” in the “Agency” field and “Coast Guard” in the
“Department” field.
147 These other documents include both: (1) those in the proposed rule category, which are
“[d]ocuments that affect other documents previously published in the proposed [or final rules]
category,” such as purely procedural notices (e.g., extension of comment period, public hearing
date), information collection requests, petitions for rulemaking and rehearing, and issuances of
guidance, see FEDERAL REGISTER DOCUMENT DRAFTING HANDBOOK, supra note 106, at 1-1–3; R
and (2) a bewildering array of more esoteric documents (e.g., proposed methodologies, summary
presentation of rules, notices of temporary deviations, concept releases, requests for comments,
and notices of Adequacy).
148 For example, the dataset as adjusted did not include any documents whose “Type of
Action” simply listed “Request for comment” because this phrase, without more, could apply to
an information collection request, a guidance document, or a petition for rulemaking as well as a
proposed rule.
149 For example, punctuation was difficult to interpret.  In a “Type of Action” listed as
“Notice of proposed rulemaking; notice of public hearing,” it was unclear whether the semicolon
should be interpreted as an “and” (i.e., both an NPRM and an associated notice of public hear-
ing), or as equivalent to a colon (i.e., the mere procedural announcement of a public hearing
connected with an earlier published NPRM).
150 Mike Carlson, Anatomy of a RIN, LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (Apr. 5, 2011), http://
blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/anatomy-of-a-rin/.
151 RINs were missing for both executive and independent agency rulemaking documents.
The Regulatory Information Service Center (“RISC”) has explained:
Using the RIN to research rulemaking documents in the Federal Register can be
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documents has 4828 unique RINs.  All documents in the dataset do
have a docket number assigned by the originating agency; logically,
this should be another method to link documents within a specific
rulemaking.  The 7413 documents without a RIN have 5713 unique
docket numbers.  Combining these approaches yields a total of 10,451
rulemakings.  Note, however, that the docket-number approach pro-
duces a far higher proportion of rulemakings (77% of documents)
than the RIN approach (39% of documents).  Hence, the Authors had
low confidence in the accuracy of the rulemakings figure and do not
use it in the study.
Finally, terminology is important in understanding the results:
“Proposed Rule” documents include NPRMs, advanced notices
of proposed rulemaking, supplemental notices of proposed rulemak-
ing, and certain “corrections” to any of these.152
“Final Rule” documents include final rules; direct, interim, tem-
porary, and emergency rules; and certain “corrections”; but exclude
guidance documents.
“Agency” is used to mean: (1) cabinet departments (including all
their constituent rulemaking entities); (2) freestanding entities such as
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”); (3) independent reg-
ulatory commissions; and (4) the miscellaneous boards, authorities,
councils, offices, and other appellations for federal entities who issued
a proposed or final rule document in the period studied.153
“Unit” is used for a discrete rulemaking entity within a cabinet
department (e.g., Federal Aviation Administration within the Depart-
ment of Transportation) or other agency (e.g., Office of Water within
EPA).154
helpful, but it will not be a perfect process.  Many agencies do not put the RIN on
the document published in the Federal Register and sometimes print a document
with the wrong RIN.  Therefore, you may get some desirable results from such
research, but with lots of potential for error.  There has been an effort for years to
get agencies to publish their documents with the RIN, but they do not always ob-
tain a RIN for documents until later when they send one to OMB for review or
report published actions to a rulemaking in the Unified Agenda.
Id. (quoting message from RISC to the author).
152 The Federal Register Handbook calls for corrections to “previously published rule[s]”
to “[f]ollow the preamble requirements for a rule.” OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, FEDERAL
REGISTER DOCUMENT DRAFTING HANDBOOK: CORRECTIONS TO A RULE 2 (2d supp. 2004).
Corrections that were labeled “technical” or “administrative” were excluded.
153 The term “Agency” corresponds to the first parsed (by semicolon) value in the
“agency_names” metadata field of the Federal Register.
154 The term “Unit” corresponds to the Federal Register metadata field “Agency.”
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“OIRA-Compliant Agencies” refers to the cabinet departments
plus any independent agency or regulatory commission that submits
their rules to OIRA for review subject to Executive Order 12,866.155
“OIRA-Independent Agencies” refers to independent agencies
and regulatory commissions that do not submit their rules to OIRA
for review.
The unmodified term “summary” is not used because, since the
1976 ACFR rulemaking, all rule documents in the Federal Register
must have a short summary that appears as the first descriptive text
after the document title and originating agency.156  These are referred
to as “summary abstracts” (reflecting how they are labeled in the Fed-
eral Register metadata) to avoid confusion with the “Executive Sum-
maries” that are the primary focus of the study.
Table 1 provides an overview of the dataset.  Fifty-one percent of
the documents were published pre-Guidance, while 49% are post-
Guidance.  Eighty-nine percent of the documents originate from
OIRA-compliant agencies.
TABLE 1.  OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING DOCUMENTS
FEBRUARY 1, 2010, TO JANUARY 31, 2014, (INCLUSIVE)
Proposed Rules Final Rules
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
Guidance Guidance Guidance Guidance
OIRA-Compliant 3527 3357 5451 5321
ORIA-Independent 529 379 623 571
All Agencies 4056 3736 6074 5892
Counterintuitively, of the total 19,578 documents in the four-year
period, the proportion of final rule documents far exceeds that of pro-
posed rule documents (61% versus 39%).  The explanation appears to
be that a substantial subset of final rule documents (29%) is labeled
155 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802
(2012).  Other researchers have taken a similar approach in including these independent agen-
cies as OIRA-compliant. See, e.g., Alex Acs & Charles M. Cameron, Does White House Regula-
tory Review Produce a Chilling Effect and “OIRA Avoidance” in the Agencies?, 43
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 443, 451 (2013) (omitting from “independent” category Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and any other inde-
pendent agency that voluntarily submits rules to the OIRA).  The Federal Register does not
have a field for whether an agency is “executive” or “independent.”
156 See 1 C.F.R. § 18.12(a)–(b) (2015).
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“direct,” “temporary,” and/or “emergency” final rules.157  Proposed
rule documents do not exist in most of these cases.158
B. Incidence of Executive Summaries
Table 2 shows how frequently agencies provided executive sum-
maries in rulemaking documents before and after OIRA Executive
Summary Guidance.  Figure 1 shows these data as percentages.  The
good news is that the incidence of executive summaries increased sub-
stantially after the Guidance, from 0.5% to 5.8% (considering all
agencies and all documents).  As would be expected, most of this in-
crease came from OIRA-compliant agencies.159  OIRA-independent
agencies show some increase, but their use of executive summaries
lags considerably behind OIRA-compliant agencies.160
TABLE 2.  INCIDENCE OF EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES
PRE- AND POST-GUIDANCE
ALL AGENCIES
Proposed Rules Final Rules
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
Guidance Guidance Guidance Guidance
Executive Summary 24 273 27 281
No Executive Summary 4032 3463 6047 5611
Total 4056 3736 6074 5892
OIRA-COMPLIANT AGENCIES
Proposed Rules Final Rules
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
Guidance Guidance Guidance Guidance
Executive Summary 22 267 20 274
No Executive Summary 3505 3090 5431 5047
Total 3527 3357 5451 5321
157 This percentage is not out of line with other reports of the incidence of these variant
types of final rulemaking documents. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemak-
ing: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 902 n.33
(2008) (noting other studies).  Of the 3495 rule documents in this subset, the largest category is
labeled “temporary,” “temporary emergency,” or “interim temporary.”  The next largest is “in-
terim,” then “direct” or “interim direct,” then a small set of “emergency.”
158 When direct final rules are published, they include a statement that the rule will become
effective on a particular date unless an adverse comment is received within a specified period.
Id. at 903.  If the agency receives adverse comments, it will withdraw the rule and start a conven-
tional notice-and-comment process. See id.  Of the 747 rule documents labeled “direct” or “in-
terim direct” in this dataset, sixty-eight are also labeled “withdraw” or “withdrawal.”  Interim
final rules are effective immediately, but with post-promulgation opportunity for comment. Id.
Of the 819 documents in this subcategory, only two are also labeled “withdraw” or
“withdrawal.”
159 See infra Table 4 (logistic regression of incidence) and accompanying text.
160 The logistic regression in Table 4, infra, further examines the relationship between issu-
ance of the Executive Summary Guidance and agency behavior.
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OIRA-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Proposed Rules Final Rules
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
Guidance Guidance Guidance Guidance
Executive Summary 2 6 7 7
No Executive Summary 527 373 616 564
Total 529 379 623 571
FIGURE 1.  PERCENTAGE OF RULE DOCUMENTS
WITH EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES



























In the post-Guidance period, OIRA-compliant agencies provided
executive summaries in proposed rule documents substantially more
often than in final rule documents.161  This matters for present pur-
poses because executive summaries in proposed rule documents po-
tentially facilitate participation.  In final rule documents, they
potentially facilitate compliance.  In the same period, OIRA-indepen-
dent agencies provided executive summaries slightly more often in
proposed rule than in final rule documents.
In the pre-Guidance period, eight agencies162 (six OIRA-compli-
ant; two OIRA-independent) included an executive summary in at
least one rulemaking document, and there was one executive sum-
mary in a multiple-agency rule document.163  These eight agencies are
161 The difference between proposed and final rule documents is significant (p < 0.001).
See also infra Table 4 (logistic regression of incidence) and accompanying text.
162 Agriculture, Education, EPA, Health & Human Services (“HHS”), Transportation
(“DOT”), Federal Communications Commission, Postal Service, and the Securities & Exchange
Commission.
163 The multiple-agency rule involved DOT and EPA.
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-4-5\GWN510.txt unknown Seq: 29 19-OCT-15 10:58
1386 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1358
referred to as “prior-practice agencies.”  In this group, only DOT and
EPA had an appreciable number of executive summaries: twenty-one
and thirteen respectively.  For both, this represented slightly less than
1% of their total rulemaking documents in the period.
In the post-Guidance period, twenty-five agencies (twenty-one
OIRA-compliant; four OIRA-independent) included an executive
summary in at least one rulemaking document.  Every cabinet depart-
ment is represented in this group.  In five instances, the executive
summary appeared in a multiple-agency rule document.164  The De-
partment of the Interior (“DOI”), not a prior-practice agency, was the
most prolific post-Guidance producer, with 159 executive summaries
representing 37% of its rule documents.165  Virtually all of these
originated from the Fish and Wildlife Service in its Endangered Spe-
cies Act rulemakings.  The Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (“HHS”) was the second most prolific, with 103 summaries
representing 32% of its rule documents.166  A substantial portion of
these documents originated from the Center for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services in rulemakings under the Affordable Care Act.  DOT
had the third highest number of summaries (59; 2.5% of rule docu-
ments) with EPA fourth (49; 2.8% of rule documents).167  Among
OIRA-independent agencies, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (“FCC”)—the most prolific prior-practice agency in this group—
continued to lead with four executive summaries representing 1.3% of
its rulemaking documents.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with
no prior practice, was second, with three executive summaries repre-
senting 5.9% of its rulemaking documents.
At first blush, the bad news about incidence is that more than
93% of OIRA-compliant agency rule documents and 98% of OIRA-
independent agency rule documents still, even after the Guidance, do
not contain an executive summary.  However, the bare numbers do
not tell the full story.  The Guidance does not attempt to establish a
universal executive-summary practice.  Rather, it focuses only on ex-
ecutive summaries for “lengthy or complex rules.”168  “Lengthy”
164 The multiple-agency rules involved DOT and EPA; Treasury, Labor, and HHS; Interior
and Commerce; and Treasury and HHS.
165 Two more rule documents containing executive summaries were published jointly with
Commerce.
166 One more rule document containing an executive summary was jointly published with
Treasury; another with Treasury and Labor.
167 DOT and EPA jointly published another rule document containing an executive
summary.
168 Exec. Summ. Guidance, supra note 46, at 1. R
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seems fairly straightforward, although there is a question whether the
relevant measure is length of the new regulatory text per se, or of the
new text plus explanatory preamble.  The former may be the literal
meaning, but the latter is the better interpretation.  The purpose of
the executive summary is to “promote public understanding” and give
“members of the public . . . a clear sense of the content” of regulatory
requirements.169  Even experts often struggle to understand the mean-
ing and import of new rules if given only the bare text of changes to
the Code of Federal Regulations without any assistance from the ex-
planatory preamble.  Therefore, as a more relevant measure of length
in terms of accessibility, this study used the number of Federal Regis-
ter pages in the rule document.170  Complexity is both more ambigu-
ous and more difficult to measure.  As a proxy, this study used
whether the agency designated the proposed or final rule as
“significant.”171
When viewed through the lens of “lengthy or complex” rule doc-
uments, the results are mixed.  As Table 3 shows, the mean length of
OIRA-compliant agency rule documents without an executive sum-
mary is substantially shorter than the mean length of documents con-
taining a summary: eight pages versus forty-nine pages.  For OIRA-
independent agencies, the means are fifteen pages versus fifty-three
pages.  However, as the standard deviations reveal, there is large vari-
ation in page length.  Moreover, “substantially shorter” is a relative
judgment.  Federal Register pages are three columns of small print.
At 900–1100 words each, these pages are roughly four times as long as
a standard double-spaced memorandum page.  Hence, for OIRA-
compliant agencies the median rule document without an executive
summary is 2700–3300 words (or 11–13 memo pages) long.  For
OIRA-independent agencies, the median length is twice that.  Most
people would balk at calling these “short” documents.  Recall, though,
that all of these documents contain a summary abstract.172  The extent
to which these short opening summaries contribute to comprehensibil-
ity is discussed in section D below.173
With respect to “complex” rules, a high proportion (45%) of rule
documents with an executive summary are designated “significant”
rules by OIRA-compliant agencies (45% versus 7% of documents
169 Id.
170 This parameter is part of the Federal Register metadata.
171 This parameter is also part of the metadata from the Federal Register.
172 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. R
173 See infra Part II.D.
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without an executive summary).  Still, less than one-third of significant
rule documents contain an executive summary.  For OIRA-indepen-
dent agencies, executive summaries appeared in less than 2% of rule
documents designated “significant.”
TABLE 3.  DOCUMENT LENGTH AND “SIGNIFICANCE” IN RULE
DOCUMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT EXECUTIVE
SUMMARIES (POST-GUIDANCE)
OIRA-Compliant OIRA-Independent
With Without With Without
Executive Executive Executive Executive
Summary Summary Summary Summary
Number of
Federal Register pages
Mean 49 8 53 15
Standard deviation 73 21 75 31
Minimum 1 1 1 1
Median 29 3 29 6
Maximum 595 782 332 636
N 541 8137 13 937
Designated “Significant”
Percent 45% 7% 15% 12%
N 246 587 2 111
To further examine the relationship between these various factors
and the presence of an executive summary, a logistic regression was
performed.  The results appear in Table 4.  In each model, the depen-
dent variable is an executive summary dummy variable, which was re-
gressed on various agency and document variables.
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TABLE 4.  LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF INCIDENCE OF EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (POST-GUIDANCE)
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)174
Compliant Agency 14.187*** 88.210**
(5.107) (179.633)
Number of Agency 0.999*** 0.999*
Rule Documents
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Prior-Practice Agency 1.905 1.206
(1.217) (0.648)
Final Rule 0.642*** 0.633***
(0.087) (0.084)
Significant Rule 5.339** 3.561*
(3.694) (2.487)
Rule Document Length 1.030 1.037**
(0.019) (0.018)
R2 0.087 0.209 0.265
Note: Odds-ratio estimates are provided.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are
clustered at the agency level.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.  Intercept terms have been omitted.  All regressions are estimated using logit.  N is
9,628.
Model 3 indicates that after the Guidance:
• An OIRA-compliant agency was eighty-eight times more likely
to include an executive summary in a rule document than an
OIRA-independent agency.  This group of agencies could be
expected to be more attentive to OIRA.175  Agencies that had
some experience with producing executive summaries prior to
the Guidance were no more likely than a non-prior-practice
agency to produce an executive summary after the Guidance.
• Volume of rulemaking had a small but significant effect on
whether an agency expends resources to provide an executive
summary.  Every additional rule document an agency produced
made it 0.999 times less likely that the document would include
an executive summary.
174
Model 3.  Coefficients
Robust
Odds Std. P > [95% Conf.
executive_summary Ratio Error z ⏐z⏐ Interval]
compliant 88.20996 179.6325 2.20 0.028 1.629724 4774.425
agency_num_rules .9993595 .0003691 -1.73 0.083 .9986363 1.000083
prior_practice_~n 1.205502 .6480543 0.35 0.728 .4203188 3.45746
final_rule .632955 .08359 -3.46 0.001 .4886079 .8199459
significant 3.561406 2.486556 1.82 0.069 .9063933 13.9935
page_length 1.036838 .0183656 2.04 0.041 1.001459 1.073466
_cons .0007998 .0013957 -4.09 0.000 .0000262 .0244574
175 See supra notes 46 & 145 and accompanying text. R
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• A proposed rule document was 1.58 times more likely to have
an executive summary than a final rule document.176  From the
perspective of increasing participation, it is desirable for an
agency to concentrate resources on providing executive sum-
maries in documents on which public comment is sought (i.e.,
proposed rule documents).
• Length of the rule document appears to matter.  Every addi-
tional Federal Register page of rule document length made it
1.037 times more likely that the document would have an exec-
utive summary.  A document about a significant rule was 3.561
times more likely to include an executive summary than a doc-
ument about a non-significant rule.  Both participation and
compliance goals are served by devoting agency resources to
providing executive summaries in long and complex (or signifi-
cant) rules.  Although agencies were more likely to provide ex-
ecutive summaries in significant than in non-significant rule
documents, recall that two-thirds of even significant rules have
no executive summary.
The remaining analysis examines characteristics of the executive sum-
maries themselves that are likely to affect comprehensibility.
C. Length and Format of Executive Summaries
The Executive Summary Guidance recognizes that agencies may
increase the comprehensibility of executive summaries by:
Controlling length.  The recommended length of no more than
three to four double-spaced pages, except for “unusually complex or
lengthy regulatory actions,”177 translates to 750–1000 words.
Using a standard, easy-to-find location.  The executive summary
should “generally” be at the beginning of the preamble.178
Standardizing organization by “sign-posting”. The Guidance
provides a suggested template with three titled sections: (1) “Purpose
of the Regulatory Action,” (2) “Summary of the Major Provisions of
the Regulatory Action [i]n Question,” and (3) “Costs and Benefits.”179
Using graphics.  For economically significant rules, costs and ben-
efits should be presented in the form of a table.180
176 Converting from final rule odds (as expressed in Table 4 supra) to proposed rule odds is
a simple inversion: 1 / 0.633 = 1.58.
177 Exec. Summ. Guidance, supra note 46, at 2. R
178 Id. at 1.
179 Id. at 2.
180 Id.
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Table 5 reports the level of compliance with these recommenda-
tions after the Guidance went into effect.  OIRA-compliant agencies
generally did well in controlling length.  The median executive sum-
mary was about two double-spaced pages; the mean, though consider-
ably higher, is still comfortably within the recommended three to four
pages.181  Executive summary length and rule document length (Table
3) are moderately correlated (r = 0.46).
TABLE 5.  LENGTH AND FORMAT OF EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES
(POST-GUIDANCE)
OIRA-Compliant OIRA-Independent
Proposed Rule Final Rule Proposed Rule Final Rule
Number of Words182
Mean 853 808 618 1407
Standard Deviation 793 850 406 1351
Minimum 60 81 125 166
Median 584 528 667 1021
Maximum 5712 6147 1179 3532
Format
Exec. Summary at Start of 53.2% 60 % 66.7% 16.7%
Preamble183
Standard Titled Sections184 37.8% 48% 0 0
Cost-Benefit Table 19.5% 18.5% 0 0
N 267 274 6 7
OIRA-compliant agencies’ conformance with the format recom-
mendations was much spottier:
• At least 40% of the time, executive summaries did not appear
at the start of the preamble.185
• The standard format was followed less than half the time, and
significantly186 less often in proposed rule documents than in
final rule documents.  Distinctive, agency-specific patterns
were evident in how executive summaries were structured.  For
example, the DOI’s Fish and Wildlife Service—which provided
181 Id.  This page conversion uses the same rule of thumb, 250 words per double-spaced
memo page, as in the analysis of “lengthy or complex” documents. See p. 1388 supra.  OIRA
does not specify how many words constitute a page.  The difference between mean length of
proposed rule and final rule executive summaries is not statistically significant.
182 Words in tables or other graphics were not included in the word count.
183 To be coded as conforming, the executive summary had to be the first content under the
“Supplemental Information” section (i.e., not preceded by a list of acronyms or table of
contents).
184 To be coded as conforming, the titles could omit the roman numerals but had to have
substantially the same text as the Executive Summary Guidance template. See supra note 179 R
and accompanying text.
185 The difference between proposed and final rules was not statistically significant.
186 Using a two-sample proportion test, p < 0.05.
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more executive summaries than any other entity—often fea-
tured a unique set of headings: “Why we need to publish a
rule,” “The basis for our action,” and “We will seek peer re-
view.”187  Certain agencies (e.g., DOT) often included multiple
footnotes.188  Others adopted a minimalist approach.  For ex-
ample, an executive summary of the Army Corps of Engineers
typically comprised a brief statement of purpose and authority
totaling fewer than one hundred words.189
• How often cost-benefit data were provided in table form for
economically significant rules is harder to determine because
the available Federal Register metadata does not separately
identify the subset of significant rules that are economically sig-
nificant. 190  A search of the historical OIRA review database
on RegInfo.gov for the two-year period in question shows 23%
of reviewed rules as economically significant.191  This propor-
tion is close to the incidence of a cost-benefit table in OIRA-
compliant agencies’ executive summaries.192
In the very small number of cases in which OIRA-independent agen-
cies provided executive summaries, the Guidance template had little
impact on format.193
Of course, the template and its directions on length and structure
are recommended, not mandatory.194  Still, the deviations are nota-
187 See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Serv., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; En-
dangered Status for the Diamond Darter and Designation of Critical Habitat: Executive Summary,
FED. REG. (July 6, 2012), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/07/26/2012-17950/endan
gered-and-threatened-wildlife-and-plants-endangered-status-for-the-diamond-darter-and#h-8.
188 See, e.g., EPA & Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 2017 and Later Model Year
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards,
FED. REG. (Oct. 15, 2012), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/10/15/2012-21972/2017-
and-later-model-year-light-duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-corporate-average-fuel
(1413 footnotes).
189 See, e.g., Defense Dep’t, Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers: Executive Sum-
mary, FED. REG. (Apr. 4, 2012), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/04/04/2012-8113/
department-of-the-army-corps-of-engineers#h-8.
190 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 802, 803 (2012) (defining economically significant as “[h]av[ing] an annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more,” or having materially adverse effects on economic sectors,
jobs, public health or safety, or government entities).
191 See Historical Reports, REGINFO.GOV, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricRe
port (last visited Aug. 23, 2015).
192 Supra Table 5.
193 Supra Table 5.
194 See Exec. Summ. Guidance, supra note 46, at 2.  Content, on the other hand, was at R
least minimally directed: “These summaries should separately describe major provisions and pol-
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ble,195 particularly in the case of agencies, such as the DOI’s Fish and
Wildlife Service, that did not have a prior executive summary practice.
This resistance to standardization accords with observations made
during efforts to normalize agency rulemaking practices on Regula-
tions.gov.196  Further research would be needed to determine the ac-
tual effect of cross-agency variation, but a reasonable hypothesis is
that consistency in location and format aid in comprehensibility, at
least for readers who are not well-versed in rulemaking and regulatory
programs.
D. Readability of Executive Summaries
Human testing is the most reliable way to determine how difficult
documents are to read and understand, and several methodologies for
assessing comprehensibility are used with human testers.197  These
methods can give a rich picture of comprehensibility, but they have
limited practicability for long documents or large numbers of docu-
ments.198  Several readability formulas exist that can be applied by ma-
chine to prepared text,199 but these formulas have important
limitations.200  They look at factors such as word length and sentence
length;201 they cannot determine whether content is unambiguous, co-
herent, well-organized, or well-structured.202  Still, they are widely
icy choices.” Id. at 1.  The present study did not attempt to determine whether executive sum-
maries contained the required content.
195 See supra Table 5.
196 See COMM. ON THE STATUS & FUTURE OF FED. E-RULEMAKING (U.S.), ACHIEVING THE
POTENTIAL: THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 24–25 (2008), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1237/.
197 See Robert W. Benson, The End of Legalese: The Game is Over, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 519, 537–40 (1984–1985).  For example, cloze testing involves removing selected
words (e.g., every fifth word) from a sample of the text to be tested and asking readers to fill in
the missing words. Id. at 538.  Based on the Gestalt theory of closure—where the brain tries to
fill in missing pieces—it derives readability from the percentage of correct insertions. Id.
198 Researchers are working on novel solutions to this problem, including crowdsourcing
human comprehensibility testing through sites such as the Legal Information Institute, and natu-
ral language processing methods that use machine learning algorithms. See Michael Curtotti et
al., Citizen Science for Citizen Access to Law 13, 16 (forthcoming 2015) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with Authors); Michael Curtotti & Eric McCreath, A Right to Access Implies a
Right to Know: An Open Online Platform for Research on the Readability of Law, 1 J. OPEN
ACCESS L. 1, 11–12 (2013), http://ojs.law.cornell.edu/index.php/joal/article/view/16/17.
199 WILLIAM H. DUBAY, THE PRINCIPLES OF READABILITY 42–54 (2004), http://www.im
pact-information.com/impactinfo/readability02.pdf.
200 Id. at 19.
201 Id. at 42–54 (providing a comprehensive review of the research establishing that these
two variables accurately predict text difficulty).
202 Id. at 19.
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used in practice, have been intensively studied and statistically vali-
dated, and are reasonably good as initial screening tools for identify-
ing problematic text.203
The set of pre- and post-Guidance summaries were analyzed us-
ing three of the most popular readability formulas—the Flesch-Kin-
caid Grade Level formula, Simple Measure of Gobbledygook
(“SMOG”), and the Coleman-Liau Index—applied through the text
analysis tool KoRpus.  Flesch-Kincaid, originally developed for the
U.S. Navy to use in assessing readability of technical manuals, is prob-
ably the most widely used assessment—in part because Microsoft
Word and other word processing programs have incorporated it and
the related Flesch Reading Ease formula.204  Some states have
adopted Flesch-Kincaid as the legal measure of readable consumer
documents.205  SMOG is often used for assessing consumer-oriented
health information.206  Some argue it is preferable to Flesch-Kincaid
for testing more complicated documents.207  It generally yields a
higher grade level than Flesch-Kincaid,208 and did so in the present
203 Id. at 19–20, 57.  William DuBay, whose 2004 report provides a thorough (and readable)
review of the development, research, and controversies around readability formulas, concludes:
The formulas have survived 80 years of intensive application, investigation, and
controversy, with both their credentials and limitations remaining intact. . . . The
variables used in the readability formulas show us the skeleton of a text.  It is up to
us to flesh out that skeleton with tone, content, organization, coherence, and
design.
Id. at 57.
204 See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Readability Studies: How Technocentrism Can Compromise Re-
search and Legal Determinations, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 147, 148–49 & n.7 (2007).
205 See id. at 148, 148–49 n.7 (collecting examples). See also Grant Richardson & David
Smith, The Readability of Australia’s Goods and Services Tax Legislation: An Empirical Investi-
gation, 30 FED. L. REV. 475, 478 (2002) (using the Flesch Reading Ease Index to assess Austra-
lian tax statutes); David Smith & Grant Richardson, The Readability of Australia’s Taxation
Laws and Supplementary Materials: An Empirical Investigation, 20 FISCAL STUD. 321, 326 (1999)
(same).
206 See, e.g., Amy S. Hedman, Using the SMOG Formula to Revise a Health-Related Docu-
ment, 39 AM. J. HEALTH EDUC. 61, 61 (2008).
207 See, e.g., P.R. Fitzsimmons et al., A Readability Assessment of Online Parkinson’s Dis-
ease Information, 40 J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS EDINBURGH 292, 294 (2010).  Some researchers
have challenged the use of readability formulas on legal texts, noting that the formulas have not
been validated on such materials. See Curtotti & McCreath, supra note 198, at 8–10.  These R
challenges, however, have been made in the context of assessing comprehensibility of statutes
and regulations—text that is highly condensed, distinctively styled and structured, and in general
“significantly different from normal English usage.” See id. at 8–9, 30–35.  The rulemaking pre-
ambles and summaries we examine here are narratives about such legal texts.  Although surely a
specialized type of writing, they generally follow normal conventions of grammar, punctuation,
and usage.
208 See Hedman, supra note 206, at 62. R
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study.  Coleman-Liau, devised to help the Department of Education
assess the readability of textbooks for public schools, differs from the
other two by analyzing characters, rather than syllables.209  Characters
are more easily machine-recognized than syllables.210  Coleman-Liau
usually gives a lower score than Flesch-Kincaid when applied to more
complex documents,211 and did so in the present study.
Table 6 shows mean readability scores of executive summaries us-
ing all three tests.  The results of all three point in the same direction
and, as expected, Flesch-Kincaid routinely yielded grade scores in be-
tween SMOG and Coleman-Liau.  For these reasons, the rest of this
Article reports only results from the Flesch-Kincaid analysis.212
TABLE 6.  MEAN READABILITY GRADE-LEVEL SCORES OF
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES, PRE- AND POST-GUIDANCE;
THREE TESTS
SMOG FLESCH-KINCAID COLEMAN-LIAU
Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
Guidance Guidance Change Guidance Guidance Change Guidance Guidance Change
A. All Agencies
Proposed 17.2 16.5 -.7* 15.9 15.3 -.6 14.5 14.0 -.5**
Final 16.7 16.2 -.5 15.3 14.8 -.5 13.9 13.8 -.1
All 16.9 16.4 -.5** 15.6 15 -.6* 14.2 13.9 -.3*
B. OIRA-Compliant Agencies
Proposed 17.1 16.5 -.6 15.8 15.2 -.6 14.5 13.9 -.6
Final 16.9 16.2 -.7** 15.6 14.8 -.8* 13.9 13.8 -.1
All 17.0 16.3 -.7** 15.7 15 -.7** 14.2 13.9 -.3
C. OIRA-Independent Agencies
Proposed 18.3 17.5 -.8 17.4 16.7 -.7 15.6 14.6 -1
Final 16.2 17.7 1.5 14.6 16.8 2.2 13.8 14.9 1.1
All 16.7 17.6 .9 15.3 16.7 1.4 14.2 14.8 .6
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Two-sided
t-tests were used to determine significance of the difference in pre-Guidance and post-Guidance
mean grade level scores.
As with readability tests themselves, the grade-level results must
be used with care.  The grade an individual has completed does not
necessarily translate to his or her actual reading level.213  Average U.S.
209 Meri Coleman & T.L. Liau, A Computer Readability Formula Designed for Machine
Scoring, 60 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 283, 283–84 (1975).
210 See id. at 283.
211 See Advanced Text Analyser—Help Topics: Readability Tests, USINGENGLISH.COM,
http://www.usingenglish.com/members/text-analysis/help/readability.html#cl (last visited Nov. 9,
2014).
212 “What is important is not how the formulas agree or disagree on a particular text, but
their degree of consistency in predicting difficulty over a range of graded texts.” DUBAY, supra
note 199, at 55. R
213 Id. at 7.
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high school graduates read at the ninth grade level, while college grad-
uates prefer to read general materials at the tenth grade level.214  At
the same time, the level of motivation and interest in the subject mat-
ter can significantly affect reading ability.215  The commonly recom-
mended standard for content intended for general use and
comprehension is between the seventh and ninth grade levels.216  This
is based on information, generated by the latest Department of Edu-
cation National Adult Literacy Survey, that 80% of U.S. adults read
below the tenth grade level.217  The average newspaper is written at
the eleventh grade level, which is considered the highest tolerable
level for those reading at the ninth grade level.218
The most striking finding from Table 6 is that executive summa-
ries are now being written at a grade level not even close to the sug-
gested seventh to ninth grade level for general comprehensibility.  All
the mean scores substantially exceed the recommended grade level,
even for college graduates. These observations hold true regardless of
the test used, the type of agency, the type of rule document, or the
timeframe (pre- or post-Guidance). Of particular importance to the
issue of public participation, executive summaries in proposed rules
tend to be even less readable than those in final rules.219
Figure 2 shows the distribution of Flesch-Kincaid grade-level
scores in post-Guidance rule documents.  The distribution for OIRA-
independent agencies is included, but keep in mind that the very small
number of documents limits the conclusions that can be drawn from
this category.
214 Id.
215 See Warren Fass & Gary M. Schumacher, Effects of Motivation, Subject Activity, and
Readability on the Retention of Prose Materials, 70 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 803, 803–07 (1978);
George R. Klare, A Second Look at the Validity of the Readability Formulas, 8 J. READING
BEHAV. 129, 139–42, 147 (1976).
216 WILLIAM H. DUBAY, WHAT IS PLAIN LANGUAGE? 1 (2004), http://qpc.co.la.ca.us/cms1
_033658.pdf [hereinafter DUBAY, WHAT IS PLAIN LANGUAGE?]; William H. DuBay, Know Your
Readers, PLAIN LANGUAGE AT WORK NEWSL., http://www.impact-information.com/impactinfo/
literacy.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) [hereinafter DuBay, Know Your Readers]; Clear and to
the Point: Guidelines for Using Plain Language at NIH, LITERACY ASSISTANCE CTR. 15, http://
www.champ-program.org/static/Guidelines%20for%20Using%20Plain%20Language.pdf (last
visited Mar. 4, 2015).
217 DUBAY, WHAT IS PLAIN LANGUAGE?, supra note 216, at 1; DuBay, Know Your Read- R
ers, supra note 216. R
218 DuBay, Know Your Readers, supra note 216. R
219 See also infra Table 10 (multiple linear regression of Flesch-Kincaid grade-level scores)
and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 2.  DISTRIBUTION OF FLESH-KINCAID GRADE-LEVEL
SCORES (POST-GUIDANCE)
In the boxplots of Figure 2, the number within each rectangle is
the median grade level, with the rectangle demarcating the middle two
quartiles (50%) of the data.  For OIRA-compliant agencies, the short-
ness of the box means that half of rule documents score within a fairly
limited range of variation.  Proposed rule documents are more varia-
ble than final rule documents.  The short horizontal lines (or “whisk-
ers”) indicate the minimum and maximum values, excluding potential
outliers (beyond 1.5 IQR,220 shown as individual points).  Note that
there are more potential outliers in the upper range of the grade-level
score—which accounts for the means in Table 6 being higher than the
medians shown here.  A potentially positive observation is that the
first quartile extends down into the more readable ranges of the
grade-level score.  This means that there are about 135 proposed and
final rule documents that could be examined in more detail in the fu-
220 The 1.5 x IQR rule is a measure of spread used with the median (just as standard devia-
tion is the measure used with the mean).  The IQR, or interquartile range, is the middle two
quartiles (the height of the box).  Calculating ±1.5 x IQR identifies the range beyond which data
points are potential outliers.
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ture better to understand what conditions enable creation of more
readable executive summaries.
As Table 6 shows, there is some evidence of a small, but statisti-
cally significant, improvement in readability after the Guidance is-
sued.221  To understand this more fully, the study first considered only
the prior-practice agencies (i.e., agencies with at least one executive
summary in the two years analyzed pre-Guidance).  Table 7 shows
these results.
TABLE 7.  MEAN FLESCH-KINCAID GRADE-LEVEL SCORES OF
PRIOR-PRACTICE AGENCIES PRE- VS. POST-GUIDANCE
No. of No. of
Pre- Post-
Guidance Pre- Guidance Post-
Exec. Guidance Exec. Guidance
Summ. F-K Mean Summ. F-K Mean
All Prior-Practice Agencies 51 15.6 246 15.3
Individual Prior-Practice Agencies
Agriculture* 3 17.6 20 15.4
Education* 1 18.2 6 15.9
Environmental Protection Agency* 13 16.7 49 15.5
Federal Communications 4 15.9 4 15.1
Commission*
Health and Human Services 3 14.1 103 15.2
Postal Service* 2 23.0 2 16.5
Securities and Exchange 3 17.0 2 19.1
Commission
Transportation 22 15.0 60 15.2
Note: * Denotes agencies with a lower mean grade-level score post-Guidance.
At the group level, the prior-practice agencies showed a very
modest (0.3 grade level) improvement in readability (i.e., decrease in
grade-level score) post-Guidance.  At the individual agency level, the
picture is more complex.  Five agencies, marked with asterisks in Ta-
ble 7, showed appreciably lower grade-level means after the Guidance
issued.  Most of these agencies, however, had very low numbers of
executive summaries in either the pre- or post-Guidance period, or in
both periods.  EPA is the interesting exception.  With a modest num-
ber of executive summaries before the Guidance and a sizable number
after, the mean grade-level score of its executive summaries dropped
from 16.7 pre-Guidance to 15.5 post-Guidance.  (The other agency
with a robust executive-summary practice both pre- and post-Gui-
dance—DOT—showed a slight increase in mean grade-level score.)
221 See supra Table 6 (under “Change” columns).
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To learn what might account for EPA’s improvement, the per-
formance of its constituent rulemaking units (“Offices” in Table 8)
was examined separately.  As Table 8 shows, the mean Flesch-Kincaid
grade-level scores vary by originating office.  Although the numbers
are not large from any office except Air and Radiation, executive
summaries from the Chemical Substances and Pollution Prevention
offices averaged a considerably lower grade-level score (14.0) com-
pared with the next lowest office (15.7).  In the future, it would be
worth investigating whether different drafting or editing practices ex-
plain one unit’s appreciably greater success in writing readable execu-
tive summaries.
TABLE 8.  MEAN FLESCH-KINCAID GRADE-LEVEL SCORES OF EPA





Air & Radiation 36 15.7
Chemical Substances & Pollution Prevention 8 14.0
Water 4 16.1
Enforcement & Compliance Assurance 1 17.4
EPA - All Offices 49 15.5
The fact that several prior-practice agencies showed improvement
after issuance of the Guidance222 suggests the possibility that experi-
ence with writing executive summaries produces more readable sum-
maries over time.  To explore this possibility, the mean post-Guidance
Flesch-Kincaid grade-level scores of the group of prior-practice agen-
cies in Table 7 was compared with the mean of the non-prior-practice
group.  As shown in Table 9, the results do not suggest that experience
helps.  Indeed, the mean for the group of less experienced agencies
was lower (14.8) than for the prior-practice group (15.3)—a difference
quantified in the regression analysis reported in Table 10 below.  In
addition, the mean score of each of the four most prolific post-Gui-
dance executive summary producers—DOI, HHS, DOT, and EPA
was compared with the mean of the remaining, less-productive agen-
cies.  Again, experience appears not to help, although the DOI—more
specifically, the Fish and Wildlife Service, which accounts for the bulk
of Interior’s executive summaries—seems to merit further study, as its
grade-level mean was lower than that of any other agency analyzed.
222 See supra Table 7.
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No. of Exec. Summ. Mean
Prior-Practice Agencies 246 15.3
Non Prior-Practice Agencies 308 14.8
Most Prolific Post-Guidance Agencies
EPA 49 15.5
Health and Human Services 103 15.2
Interior 161 14.6
Transportation 60 15.2
All Other Agencies 181 15.2
Finally, the study looked at whether readability improved over
time, as agencies presumably acquired more experience writing execu-
tive summaries.  Examining mean grade-level scores by month over
the twenty-four-month post-Guidance period revealed no trend of
improvement.
To determine how various agency and rule characteristics af-
fected Flesch-Kincaid grade-level scores in the post-Guidance period,
a linear regression was performed. The results are reported in Table
10.
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TABLE 10.  MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION OF FLESCH-KINCAID
GRADE-LEVEL SCORES OF EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES
(POST-GUIDANCE)
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)223
Compliant agency -1.500 -1.310 -1.189
(1.049) (0.980) (1.029)
No. of Agency Rule 0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0004**
Documents (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
No. of Executive -0.003 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0005
Summaries (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Prior-Practice 1.250*** 1.479*** 1.598***
Agency (0.250) (0.215) (0.256)
Final Rule -0.460** -0.451** -0.424**
(0.215) (0.216) (0.199)
Significant Rule 0.447 0.422 0.279
(0.329) (0.370) (0.397)
Rule Document -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.001
Length (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes
R2 0.016 0.088 0.101 0.140
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the agency level.  *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Intercept terms have been omitted.
All regressions are estimated using OLS.  To control for time fixed effects, a full set of year*month
dummies are included in Model 4. N is 455.
The results in Model 4 indicate that:
• An executive summary produced by a prior-practice agency
was likely to have a Flesch-Kincaid score of 1.598 grade levels
higher than one produced by an agency that began writing ex-
ecutive summaries only after the Guidance issued.  This sug-
gests that the comprehensibility rationale of the Guidance had
little impact on agencies with an existing executive summary
practice; these agencies did not perceive the Guidance to re-
quire any fundamental change in how they write executive
summaries.  This is consistent with the results in the earlier re-
gression, 224 that prior-practice agencies were no more likely
223
Model 4.  Coefficients
Std. P >
grade Coef. Error T ⏐t⏐ [95% Conf. Interval]
Compliant -1.189342 1.029486 -1.16 0.251 -3.237316 .8586332
num_of_rules_by~n -.0003837 .0001785 -2.15 0.035 -.0007388 -.0000287
num_of_ES_per_d~t -.0005008 .0031665 -0.16 0.875 -.0068 .0057984
final_rule -.423906 .1992442 -2.13 0.036 -.8202662 -.0275459
Significant .2790243 .3971636 0.70 0.484 -.5110607 1.069109
page_length -.0007176 .002618 -0.27 0.785 -.0059256 .0044904
prior_practice_~n 1.598087 .2555843 6.25 0.000 1.089649 2.106526
Note: Coefficients for dummy time fixed effects are not presented because of space restrictions.
224 Supra Table 4.
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than non-prior-practice agencies to provide summaries after
the Guidance.
• Appearing in a proposed rule document added 0.424 to the ex-
ecutive summary’s grade-level score, as compared with an ex-
ecutive summary in a final rule document.  Hence, the
participation-positive finding that agencies provided an execu-
tive summary more often in proposed rule documents225 is un-
dercut by the fact that these proposed rule executive
summaries are less readable than those in final rule documents.
This disparity merits further study.226  In particular, it would be
helpful to understand how agencies prepare executive summa-
ries and whether there are differences in practice between the
proposed rule and the final rule stages that could explain why
final rule executive summaries were likely to be more readable.
• Every additional rule document an agency published reduced
the grade-level score by a small but significant amount
(0.0004).  If “translating” rulemaking material into shorter,
plainer language is more effortful, this is an unexpected result.
In fact, this result is in direct contrast with the earlier finding
that busier rulemaking agencies were less likely to include an
executive summary.227  Still, the amount of the effect is quite
small.
• Neither the length of the rule document nor whether the rule is
significant has a discernible relationship to the grade-level
score.  This is actually good news, as one might reasonably ex-
pect that executive summaries in lengthy and complex (i.e.,
“significant”) rules would be even less readable than those in
shorter or non-significant rules.  Less positive is the observa-
tion that experience in writing executive summaries (measured
by number of executive summaries written) appears to have no
effect on readability.
225 Supra Table 4.
226 Unlike the preponderance of final rule documents over proposed rule documents in the
entire dataset, see supra Table 1; supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text, the subset of docu- R
ments containing executive summaries is almost evenly divided between proposed (273) and
final (281).  Therefore, the greater readability of final rule executive summaries is unlikely to be
accounted for by a large group of potentially easier to explain (and thus more readable) direct
final or interim final rules.
227 Supra Table 4.
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E. Readability of Executive Summaries Versus the Rest of the
Preamble
Finally, the study compared the readability of executive summa-
ries with the readability of other parts of the rulemaking document.
Given their average Flesch-Kincaid grade-level scores, executive sum-
maries will not be very comprehensible to ordinary readers—but per-
haps they are still more readable than the rest of the document.
First, executive summaries were compared with the remainder of
the preamble text.  Table 11 shows an unexpected result—executive
summaries are substantially less readable than the rest of the pream-
ble. This is true regardless of the type of agency or the type of
document.
TABLE 11.  MEAN FLESCH-KINCAID GRADE SCORES OF EXECUTIVE





Proposed 15.3 13.6 +1.64**
Final 14.8 13.7 +1.12**




Proposed 15.2 13.6 +1.61**
Final 14.8 13.7 +1.12**




Proposed 16.7 13.8 +2.9**
Final 16.8 16.1 +0.7
All 16.7 14.9 +1.8**
Note: ** denotes significance at the 5 % level.228
Next, the executive summaries were compared with the summary
abstracts, the shorter summaries that appear at the start of every Fed-
eral Register rule document.  The results, shown in Table 12, are again
striking: the summary abstracts are less readable than the executive
summaries by an even greater margin than the difference between the
executive summary and the rest of the preamble.  Recall that the sum-
mary abstract is the only summary available in 93% of OIRA-compli-
228 Paired t-tests were used, which compare the score of the executive summary of a given
document with the score of the rest of the preamble of the same document.
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ant agency rule documents and 98% of OIRA-independent agency
rule documents.229
TABLE 12.  MEAN FLESCH-KINCAID GRADE SCORES OF SUMMARY




Summary Abstract Summary Difference
Proposed 18.5 15.3 +3.2**
Final 19 14.8 +4.2**
All 18.7 15.0 +3.7**
OIRA-COMPLIANT AGENCIES
Executive
Summary Abstract Summary Difference
Proposed 18.3 15.2 +3.1**
Final 18.9 14.8 +4.1**
All 18.6 15.0 +3.6**
OIRA-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Executive
Summary Abstract Summary Difference
Proposed 23.1 16.7 +6.4**
Final 24.5 16.8 +7.7*
All 23.8 16.7 +7.1**
Note: ** denotes significance at the 5% level.230
F. Discussion
In future studies, more sophisticated and fine-grained analyses
could be done on the dataset.  For example, the most readable quar-
tile of executive summaries, summary abstracts, and preambles could
be examined for clues about when and how agencies produce more
comprehensible text.  But the basic picture seems clear: even with a
history at least as long as that of ACUS itself, plain-language efforts
still have not produced rulemaking documents that most of the public
can use in writing meaningful comments.
The preambles are very long and written at a level most college
graduates would find challenging.  More sobering is the unexpected
discovery that when agencies try to summarize these materials, what
readers gain in shorter length is offset by substantially less readable
text.  Apparently, when rule writers try to compress content, they use
more complex sentences and more jargon—and the greater the com-
pression, the greater the loss in clear and simple expression.
229 See supra Figure 1 and related discussion.
230 Paired t-test were used, which compare the score of the executive summary of a given
document with the score of the preamble of the same document.
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In particular, OIRA’s effort to use executive summaries as a way
to “promote public understanding” and give “members of the pub-
lic . . . a clear sense of the content” of proposed and final rules231 is a
regulatory misfire.  More agencies are indeed providing executive
summaries more often, and the practice is more common in long rules
and in proposed rules.  However, the executive summaries in pro-
posed rules are less likely to follow a standard format—and are writ-
ten at a higher grade level—than those in final rules.  In general,
experience does not seem to help agencies write more readable execu-
tive summaries.  Executive summaries are significantly less readable
than the preambles they are supposedly explaining, and the most that
can be said in their favor is that the summary abstracts (which would
otherwise be a reader’s only guide to the content of the rule) are even
worse.
III. WHERE FROM HERE?
“It is strange that free societies should thus arrive at a situation
where their members are governed from cradle to grave by
texts they cannot comprehend.”
—F.A.R. Bennion (1990)232
“[T]he Committee is of the opinion that the need for, and in-
tended effect of, even the most complex and technical regula-
tion can be explained in words that can be understood by a
person who is not an expert in the subject matter.”
—Administrative Committee of
the Federal Register (1976)233
Almost exactly forty-five years after its Consumer Bulletin Rec-
ommendation, ACUS again recognized the relationship between pub-
lic rulemaking participation and comprehensible rulemaking
documents in its recommendations on the use of social media:
When soliciting input through a social media platform, agen-
cies should provide a version of the NPRM that is “friendly”
and clear to lay users.  This involves, for example, breaking
preambles into smaller components by subject, summarizing
those components in plain language, layering more complete
231 Exec. Summ. Guidance, supra note 46, at 1. R
232 F.A.R. BENNION, BENNION ON STATUTE LAW 10 (3d ed. 1990).
233 1976 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 56,624. R
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versions of the preamble below the summaries, and provid-
ing hyperlinked definitions of key terms.234
Experience under OIRA’s Executive Summary Guidance sug-
gests that the odds of this recommendation being successfully imple-
mented are very low—unless something changes.
Simply adding more mandates to write comprehensible rulemak-
ing documents (or at least comprehensible shorter versions of those
documents) is clearly not the answer.  Agencies are now, and have for
some time been, subject to multiple directives from Congress, the
White House, and the Federal Register to write preambles and sum-
maries that can be understood by people who are not experts in the
area.  The Plain Language Action and Information Network is a cross-
agency group of federal employees who have been working to raise
awareness and provide training materials on comprehensible writing
for almost twenty years.235  Their website, PlainLangauge.gov, con-
tains a wealth of resources.  Moreover, it is hard to imagine that the
problem is a lack of instructional resources on clear and simple writ-
ing.  Similarly, the U.S. General Services Administration’s Office of
Citizen Services and Innovative Technologies offers frequent blog
posts and online workshops on plain language on their informative,
easy-to-read platform.236
To avoid simply doing the same thing over and over and expect-
ing a different outcome,237 agencies and their overseers need a better
understanding of why those who write rule preambles and summaries
are not now writing clearer, simpler documents.  Here are some possi-
ble explanations that could be investigated:
• Rule documents are drafted by people who write like lawyers
(or engineers, or economists, or scientists).  Our educational sys-
tem tends to associate more advanced writing with more complex
vocabulary and sentence structure.  Professional education adds
exponentially to this tendency.  Professions are communities of
practice defined, in important part, by shared specialized vocabu-
lary and language structures that can make communication more
234 ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269,
76,271 (Jan. 17, 2012).
235 See About Us, PLAIN LANGUAGE ACTION & INFO. NETWORK, http://www.plainlanguage
.gov/site/about.cfm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
236 See About, DIGITALGOV, http://www.digitalgov.gov/about/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
237 The definition of insanity famously, but perhaps erroneously, attributed to Albert Ein-
stein. See Michael Becker, Einstein on Misattribution: “I Probably Didn’t Say That”, BECKER’S
ONLINE J. (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.news.hypercrit.net/2012/11/13/einstein-on-misattribution-
i-probably-didnt-say-that/.
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efficient within the group—but that also function (intentionally
or not) to exclude outsiders.238
• Rule documents are drafted by people who are experts.  Al-
though related to the first possibility, this explanation focuses on
an identified cognitive weakness of experts: they are singularly
bad at placing themselves in the position of a novice.239  Experts
tend greatly to underestimate the needs of someone unfamiliar
with their area of specialty.240  Hence, it is especially hard for
them to produce explanations that are comprehensible to non-
experts.241
• Rule documents are drafted by people who already have too
many mandates with which to comply and plain-language is low
on the priority list.  Precisely because higher education and the
acquisition of expertise ingrain habits of more complex writing,
drafting (or redrafting) in plain language is time consuming and
hard.  As one of dozens of requirements with which rule writers
must comply, plain-language mandates are the last thing anyone
is worrying about.  Neither OIRA, the Federal Register, nor a
reviewing court is going to send a rule back to an agency for fail-
ure to write preambles or summaries that can be understood by
ordinary readers.
• Rule documents are drafted by people who do not believe that
broader rulemaking participation would add value to the pro-
cess.  This is related to the previous possibility but has a slightly
different motivational twist.  For many agencies, Internet-facili-
tated public comments have not been a good thing.  Mass com-
ment campaigns by advocacy groups and grassroots-based
comment blitzes—such as the one that overwhelmed the Federal
Communications Commission in the net neutrality rulemak-
ing242—have made it easy for rule writers to associate more public
238 See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Knowledge in the People: Rethinking “Value” in Public
Rulemaking Participation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185, 1190, 1192–94 (2012) (discussing
rulemaking as a community of practice).
239 See Pamela J. Hinds, The Curse of Expertise: The Effects of Expertise and Debiasing
Methods on Predictions of Novice Performance, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 205, 206
(1999).
240 Id.; see also Pamela J. Hinds et al., Bothered by Abstraction: The Effect of Expertise on
Knowledge Transfer and Subsequent Novice Performance, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1232,
1241–42 (2001).
241 Hinds et al., supra note 240, at 1241–42. R
242 See Jacob Kastrenakes, FCC Received a Total of 3.7 Million Comments on Net Neutral-
ity, THE VERGE (Sept. 16, 2014, 6:06 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/16/6257887/fcc-net-
neutrality-3-7-million-comments-made.
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participation with more work, not more useful information.243
Here, the failure of most recent plain-language efforts to empha-
size the relationship between comprehensibility and meaningful
participation is especially unfortunate.  In fact, we simply do not
know how broader rulemaking participation would evolve if indi-
viduals and small entities directly affected by new regulations
could actually understand what an agency was proposing and
why.244
• Rules are too technical and judicial review is too demanding
for rulemaking documents to be written in plain language.  This
“explanation” is included principally to take it off the table.
Even if it were true that most rules are highly technical (an em-
pirical claim that should be proved, not assumed) and that pream-
bles written to be understandable by non-experts could not
contain the information required to survive judicial review (a du-
bious proposition, at best), this does not explain why agencies are
not at least producing easy-to-read summaries.
What is needed now is evidence, not speculation.  If, for ex-
ample, a study of rule-writing practices were to conclude that pro-
fessional acculturation makes it difficult for time-pressed rule
writers to create explanations that non-experts can understand,
then an appropriate recommendation might be to give other
types of agency staff the responsibility of writing summaries and
user-friendly versions of the NPRM.  These people might be a
cadre of trained drafters and editors, as in Canada.245  Or perhaps
a larger role could be carved out for the kinds of communications
professionals that agencies increasingly employ to create their
web content and manage their social media presence.246
When the Authors talk to professional or academic groups
about CeRI’s RegulationRoom project, someone in the audience
often asks for proof that the effort involved in “translating”
rulemaking documents, and otherwise supporting informed par-
243 See Farina et al., supra note 44, at 130–31. R
244 The RegulationRoom project has shown that, in carefully selected rulemakings and with
adequate technical and human support, rulemaking newcomers can effectively engage the issues
and make thoughtful, relevant comments. See FARINA & NEWHART, supra note 26, at 15–17. R
245 The Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice holds regular national confer-
ences for the “legislative drafting community,” which is understood to include drafting of regula-
tions. See Mandate, CAN. INST. ADMIN. OF JUST., http://www.ciaj-icaj.ca/en/legal-drafters/man
date (last updated Sept. 4, 2014).
246 Kendrick Daniel, Hiring for Your Digital Needs, DIGITALGOV (Feb. 9, 2015), http://
www.digitalgov.gov/2015/02/09/hiring-for-your-digital-needs/.
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ticipation by affected individuals, small businesses, and other his-
torically missing stakeholders, is justified by  “new” information
that such commenters provide.  The Authors answer this question
by talking about the kinds of situated knowledge that these new
voices can—and do—contribute.247  But surely the assumption
behind the question should not go unchallenged.  The status quo,
in which only the expert or well-resourced can comprehend
rulemaking documents,248 is accepted because it is familiar, not
because it is right or inevitable.  ACUS is uniquely positioned to
mount the kind of sympathetic, yet searching, examination of cur-
rent agency practices that could uncover the reasons why more
plain-language mandates are not producing more understandable
rulemaking documents.  With this knowledge may come the abil-
ity to recommend changes that actually work to give all “inter-
ested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments . . . .”249
247 See Dmitry Epstein et al., The Value of Words: Narrative as Evidence in Policy Making,
10 EVIDENCE & POL’Y 243, 247–55 (2014); Farina et al., supra note 238, at 1196–97. R
248 See Farina et al., supra note 238, at 1192–94. R
249 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
